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This thesis analyzes the American mass media’s narrative on the Israel-Palestine
conflict to understand the power of ideographs and their influence on specific publics. I
focus on two popular ideographs in mass media reporting, <terrorism> and <democracy>,
in order to examine how these ideographs are utilized to construct a narrative for the
media’s publics, the political ideologies they represent, the agendas they further, and the
consequences their narrow use has on developing counterpublics and emerging
alternative narratives around the conflict. I focus my attention on the mass media’s
coverage of a sixteen day Israeli shelling in Gaza and how public consent is acquired by
implementing ideographs as ideological representations. I employ McGee’s (1980)
discussion of the ideograph’s historic and social dimensions to inform my analysis.
Ultimately, I argue that the mass media’s use of these ideographs results in a narrow
construction of both the conflict and the Middle East for its corresponding publics,
preventing the rhetoricity of counterpublics and discouraging public dissent.
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CHAPTER I
TALKING TODAY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE CURRENT
NARRATIVE OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT
Introduction
This project analyzes the use, influence, and power of one rhetorical concept in
American mass media—the ideograph—as a way to understand the ideological beliefs
and actions of publics. The ideograph is the articulation of ideas, the representation of an
ideology that works to rhetorically persuade the social masses while guaranteeing its
survival through audience’s subsequent conversations and various texts in the public
sphere. Because the mass media frequently employs ideographic terms in their reporting,
understanding the ideologies that comprise the meaning of these terms is necessary to
comprehend what actions the media is justifying and how they are employing ideographs
to do so. It can also help examine the consequences of a public hegemony and the
conditions that are repressing the natural emergence of counterpublics around issues of
war and diplomacy. In order to best explore the mass media’s rhetorical strategy with
ideographs, I focus my analysis on their coverage of the 16 day shelling of Palestine by
the Israeli military in the summer of 2014. The mass media’s coverage around the
summer bombings provides a fertile ground of analysis due to its frequent and aggressive
use of ideographs to assign blame in the wake of escalated hostilities between the two
countries. The mass media also employs these ideographs to discourage the proliferation
of information that does not align with their ideological viewpoint, tampering with the
1

minds and beliefs of their devoted publics.
The term media is incredibly broad. Even with this project’s focus on mass media,
there are still several media available for communication including radio, blogs, podcasts,
and others. Because it is impossible to analyze all forms of American mass media, I will
limit my analysis to the televised and social media efforts of corporate owned media.
Since many Americans still collect their information from mass media hubs, a majority of
the artifacts of analysis consist of clips from popular American mass media platforms,
such as CNN, FOX NEWS, MSNBC, and ABC news. The cohesive element that binds
these clips together is their blatant use of <terrorism>1 and <democracy> to communicate
an ideological agenda. The mass media’s reporting purposefully prevents the emergence
of an oppositional narrative that their viewers could encounter and ascribe to. It is worth
noting that while the mass media remains the first choice for news, their viewers do not
account for all publics and public opinion. The publics discussed and referred to
throughout this project are those that identify with the media, the ideas it supports, the
information it provides, and the status it aims to preserve. Mass media publics are
diverse. They are democrats, republicans, men, women, Caucasian, African American,
southerners, northerners, tall, short, young, and old. Yet, the statistical diversity of a
public is irrelevant. What joins these groups together is the circulation of the media’s
address of their beliefs and their viewing the media as a trusted source of information.
However, not every American trusts or watches American mass media. There are publics
that oppose or counter the mass media’s beliefs. These publics are known as

Ideographs are typically enclosed in these brackets to help differentiate them as a special grammar.
McGee likens the symbol of the ideograph to Chinese symbols, which he says both signify and “contain” a
unique ideological commitment (7). The brackets then work to separate ideographs from our basic
vocabulary and emphasize its status as another form of vocabulary.
1
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counterpublics. Mass media counterpublics, while coming into contact with mass media
reporting, don’t embrace its ideology, but rely on other news outlets. The idea behind
Counterpublics and those of Israel-Palestine reporting are addressed in the last chapter.
For now, it suffices to say that not everyone who sees mass media embraces its ideas.
Because of these counterpublics, it would be erroneous to imply that phrases like public
opinion or American mass media include everyone who calls The United States their
home.
Thus, this thesis uses the ideographs <terrorism> and <democracy> to show how
consent for the current hegemonic narrative on Israel-Palestine is acquired through
rhetorical methods and the effects that this narrative has on mass media publics. Using
the ideograph as a lens of analysis allows me to make three specific moves. First, I will
show how the current hegemony and its ideologies rhetorically reduce the communities
of the Middle East to Radical Islamic terrorists and natural enemies of the United States’
democratic aspirations. After analyzing this rhetorical trend, I will discuss the historical
and social dimensions of the dominant rhetorical rationale and its influence on the
American media’s depiction of the Palestinian people, their rights, and their value in
relation to our Israeli allies. Finally, I will use sources outside of the mass media to create
a narrative that depicts Gazans as endangered civilians rather than fundamental terrorists.
Because the association among Americans, Palestinians, and Gazans has had decades to
unfurl, it is impossible to capture the entirety of their complex, intertwined history within
the scope of this project.
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Ideographs and Hegemony
Coined by rhetorical scholar Michael Calvin McGee, the ideograph is the link
between the ideology of a public and its presence in their subsequent discourse. An
ideograph is a term that uses an abstract meaning to represent and communicate the
ideological beliefs and agendas of a public. Because of its ability to destabilize the often
unquestioned ideas of common sense, Truth, “the way things are,” and other phrases that
protect ideologies from criticism, the philosophy of the ideograph is often mentioned in
tandem with Karl Marx and his definition of ideology as false consciousness. And while
this project agrees with Marx’s vision of a diverse and powerful non-elite society, it does
not stop at the binary between elite and non-elite ideology. I understand ideology not
simply as false consciousness. Rather, ideologies are present in every mind’s worldview
as they are the way that ideas work and prevail in a thinking individual. They shift in the
minds of individuals depending on what information is allowed to make noise and
receive feedback. To agree with McGee, “The falsity of an ideology is specifically
rhetorical” (McGee 4).
The use of the ideograph necessitates a discussion on hegemonic structures.
Hegemony is a relationship between the dominant and dominated. It is the process of
maintaining the systems of values that shape peoples’ perceptions of their reality. Antonio
Gramsci’s work on hegemony remains profoundly important, especially his discussions
on the functions of social hegemony. Gramsci’s most relevant hegemonic function is that
of acquiescence, what he calls the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of
the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant
fundamental group” (5). Elaborating on Gramsci’s idea of hegemonic consent is Jennifer
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Daryl Slack, who attributes given consent to ideology. Claiming that ideology is the way
to acquire consent, Slack writes that it is “conceived” (9) out of the “articulation of
disparate elements” (9), whose effective communication to publics garner their
participation in the production of the hegemony. Cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall see
articulation as a “process of creating connections” (Slack 5), connections that, because
they have no necessary “belongingness” (Hall 141), can be rearticulated in a myriad of
ways. In other words, because the connections between ideologies are rhetorically
constructed rather than absolute, the rhetorical appeals of written, visual, and audio texts
can be examined, the communicated ideologies denaturalized, the dominance of these
articulated relations realized, and its effects on the public sphere understood. Because this
relationship is rhetorical, we can understand consent and the maintenance of seemingly
inclusive and egalitarian hegemonies by examining when and how these articulations are
used. With the rhetorical surpassing the material in terms of certainty and truth, Gramsci
would probably say that what is certain is gone and “what is ‘true’ will be a truth only of
word; that is to say, precisely, rhetoric” (8).
Because a cultural hegemony requires great and continuous effort to become a
seemingly natural part of the working universe, the forces that a hegemony works to
combat is a vital starting point in realizing the constructed and overwhelmingly
subjective nature of society’s meta terms. The present day mass media works to
naturalize their ideologies by discouraging critique or doubt from its publics while
constantly reaffirming its beliefs. These ideas include: the duty of Americans to support
pro-Zionist policies, the dangers of the Arab world and its people, and the still unhealed
scars from September 11th that justify extended involvement in the Middle East. Then
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there are the frequently excluded texts: first-hand accounts of the humanitarian atrocities
happening in Gaza amidst the longest military occupation of the modern world, images
and commentary that focus on the devastated lives of citizens rather than the actions of
Hamas, statistics, and data that go unreported during this war on terror. Reporting these
realities alongside the standard mass media report could expose audiences to the hellish
fates of forgotten Gazans who are overshadowed by god, politics, and The World Trade
Center. Such a report runs the risk of public dissent amongst mass media audiences and
of hegemonic collapse. Mass media works to discourage its viewers of this dissent in
order to reproduce its dominance, assuring audience consent.
The American Mass Media’s Reporting on Israel-Palestine
Ideology works by deciding what individuals believe to be possible. Audiences
and rhetors reinforce and spread their ideological beliefs to other audiences through
communication, allowing the potential and veracity of their words to be weighed by
others. The democratic nature of the public sphere breaks down when representation is
not available to all participants in the global conversation and one ideology begins to
dominate all others. In the modern day public sphere, this domination is easier than ever
to accomplish via advertising, the speed of technology, and the connectedness it has
facilitated for the world. No platform is as lethal a mixture of outreach, voice, and
advertising as the American mass media. Depending on the power of the voice or
information outlet, an ideology and its ideographic offspring can take up far greater space
in the public sphere than is typical, figuratively crowding and pushing out naturally
emerging narratives. Narratives that counter the longevity of the dominant ideology or
hegemony are inevitably pushed out, preventing viewers from hearing the other sides of
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the story. Arguably, the media provides some of the most comprehensive opportunities
for voicing and circulating its endorsed ideologies. American mass media in particular is
a juggernaut in selling the beliefs of the powerful. Criticism of the mass media machine
frequently cautions audiences that their advertising power for ideological platforms has
reached a level of influence that is impossible to escape completely. Mass media critique
leaves us with the idea that because the system has become so permeated by a small set
of beliefs as well as fine-tuned to reproduce them that the social mass has no choice but
to breathe in ideas that do not represent their embodied knowledge. Despite this
knowledge, droves of citizens still trust the corporate owned media to represent their
concerns and deliver their information. Foreboding information is never easily received,
which could explain why, despite the current distrust of government in the United States,
their official platforms of action, exceptionalism, and patriotic determination are sought
out by the social masses. Whatever the reason, American mass media has become
masterful in reproducing and maintaining the status quo through the dominance of
information circulation. Ideographs are a large part of this reproduction in terms of
political language. They also facilitate the overwhelming social influence of the mass
media, allowing it to demonstrate its power and potential within the public sphere.
No one need look further than the current topic of Israel-Palestine to see the mass
media’s use of ideographs. The conception of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the United
States has been heavily influenced by the American twenty-four-hour news cycle. The
ideographs around the Middle East have had a long, uncontested, rhetorical life, a fact
made all the more obvious by their continuing presence in supposedly objective
journalism. The ideographs used presently are <terrorism> and <democracy>, the former
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pertaining to the image of the post September 11th Arab, and the latter referring to
America and the antithesis of the Orient. Prior to September 11th, two previous versions
of these ideographs dominated the ideological conversation between the West and the
Middle East, <west> and <Islam>. Though these previous ideographs imply a dramatic
difference in worldview (the West is known for its democratic model and separation of
church and state while Islam implies a now antiquated theocratic form of government),
they do not communicate the same aggressive binary relationship that is found in our
current ideographs.
Consider the rhetoric in the aftermath of the attack: President George W. Bush’s
speech to the nation, given on September 11th utilized the phrase “terrorist attacks” while
Osama Bin Laden’s video message was soon aired, cementing the status of those
involved as terrorists rather than another equally disobedient term. Bush’s speech also
heavily characterized the United States as the victim of freedom haters, once in his
opening statement, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came
under attack” (CNN.com) and again in his explanation of the attack, “America was
targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the
world” (CNN.com). Both of these statements show Bush using the idea of freedom to
characterize the West’s form of democracy, while constructing the entire Islamic world as
terrorists who are attempting to stop the spread of American-esque freedom.
Phrases such as these provide an example of how ideographs shift forms and still
retain the ideological beliefs of their previous incarnations. While <west> and <Islam>
refer to the differences between the region’s governing philosophies, <democracy> and
<terrorism> designate which spheres do what. This creates an adversarial relationship by
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defining the two regions as fundamentally opposed based on the actions of their
governing bodies. This is exactly how these ideographs have been exercised: as
restrictive rhetorical screens that have directed the conversation toward innately violent
characteristics of Middle Eastern civilizations rather than the social conditions that are
producing the devastation of the region and its citizens. Because ideographs emerge at the
intersection of history and modern society, it is accurate to say that this shift to a more
adversarial ideographic binary both influenced and was influenced by the narrative of the
anti-democratic Middle East and the endless numbers of fundamental Islamic terrorists
reported to reside there.
Literature Review
Scholars of rhetorical studies have taken up McGee’s concept of the ideograph to
explain various social phenomena. In her Rhetoric Review article, Jessica Enoch uses the
ideograph to explore the idea of <home> during World War II and the ideologies that
dictated the system’s response to women working outside of the home as a much needed
part of the war effort. Enoch relies on the ideograph to answer the questions of how the
childcare centers of WWII were able to lose public support as quickly as they were able
to accrue it. With the influx of women into the workplace, the United States was forced to
establish childcare centers which directly challenged the previously established definition
of <home>, an “ideal, imagined and feminized space” (Enoch 3) that ultimately worked
to classify “suitable childcare options for mothers, affecting and directing their
experiences as workers inside and outside the family residence” (Enoch 3). Explaining
ideographs as understandings that are “elaborated and constrained through use and
circumstance” (7), Enoch uses the rhetorical nature of the ideograph to show the strategy
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behind gaining support for childcare centers by subverting the gendered definitions that
typically accompanied the idea of child rearing.
In “John Pym, Ideographs, and the Rhetoric of Opposition to the English Crown”
Jim Kuypers and Matthew Althouse use the ideograph in a more positive light,
illustrating how “those who maintain control over their use and meanings gain
opportunities to achieve and utilize power” (229). The strength of their analysis is found
in understanding the ideograph’s denotative meaning along with the ways ideographs
articulate these meanings. Kuypers and Althouse demonstrate how the use of the
ideograph shows discourse as a “transformative manifestation of changes in ideology
and . . . public consciousness” (6) as well as takes an audience from simple Platonic
rationale thinking to “creations” (6) which can be inserted into an argument as a
legitimizing force (6). The authors use these definitions of the ideograph to illustrate the
transformative power of language and ideologies in the public mind, lending support to
the idea that while no one is free from the grasp of ideology, dominant world views can
shift as rhetors work to create audiences through their use of rhetoric.
The work of Edward Said in Orientalism illustrates the ways in which ideographs
work to conceptualize the Middle East. Published in 1979, Orientalism remains the
standard in understanding the conversation around the Arab’s presence in the West. Few
texts since have established a broad but coherent argument of the historical subjugation of
the Arab identity. Although Said never explicitly mentions the ideograph (McGee would
not coin the term for another year after the release of Orientalism), his area of focus lends
itself to the exact type of analysis proposed by McGee. Amongst his numerous critiques,
Said discusses the process that has left the Arab a one-dimensional reaper in American
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minds. Said mentions the removal of Middle Eastern history, language, and culture from
academia, the defining of the Arab through the Zionist narrative, and the wealth of
information about the region in relationship to war, oil, bombs, and American
intervention. More recently, the focus on American military campaigns and occupation of
the Middle East has spread from the media to academia. The creep of media ideology into
academia increases the number of publics who are learning that dissent from the mass
media’s narrative is wrong. Said’s Orientalism marks one of the premiere instances
where an intellectual openly endorsed the Palestinian right to statehood while drawing
attention to the restrictive power of our current language in order to demand a different
discourse from citizens. Academia and academic freedom have served as havens from
hegemony for decades. To lose this platform would make impactful works like
Orientalism impossible for public access and eliminate another platform for
counterpublics.
An overwhelming majority of analyses on the media and/or the narratives around
Israel-Palestine are found in the field of communication. A great deal of attention is
devoted to analyzing the media in terms of representation and sources, along with the
linguistic analysis of language. Alina Korn’s “Reporting Palestinian Casualties in the
Israeli Press: the case of Haaretz and the intifada” traces the erasure of Palestinian death
statistics in Israeli newspapers and the purposeful placement of these statistics to side
pages and low traffic areas. These omissions, along with failure to report the
overwhelming amount of Palestinian civilian deaths, are attributed to the media’s
constant efforts in assigning terrorism a Palestinian face. Korn states that the media
“contributed to the militarization of the conflict by presenting and defining the uprising
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as an outburst of inexplicable violence and terrorism. At the same time, the media played
down Israeli violence and defined it in terms of a ‘mere reaction and self-defense” (2).
Specific components of this project, such as the numerically unfair representation
enjoyed by Israeli guests and sources in the mass media are also well documented and
discussed. Lisa Thomas “Reconstructions of Reality” switches from statistics of the dead
to statements of the living with her analysis on sources utilized by the media in its
reporting. Focusing her discussion on the “historic” 2005 withdrawal of Israel from Gaza,
she argues that the coverage given to Israel’s withdrawal of Gaza as a step toward peace
worked to obscure the illegal settlements of Israel in the West Bank while drawing
attention to the Israeli point of view on the meaning of the withdrawal. In her overall
assessment, Thomas states that according to the analysis of BBC and ITV news coverage,
the chosen materials “failed to provide adequate historical context in their news reports,
which significantly distorted audiences’ perceptions of the conflict. Moreover, it was
found that Israelis were interviewed twice as many times as Palestinians and news
accounts tended to reiterate Israeli perspectives” (3). More importantly however, is her
mention of narrative and problems of representation that arise from media reporting. This
theme of representation frequently appears in journalism studies and several articles take
up the meaning of representation in their various ways.
In “The Conflicting Israeli Terrorist Image” Robert Handley analyzes the frequent
depiction of Arabs and Muslims as not only terrorists, but as terrorists even in situations
where they are the true victims of conflict with Israel. The most powerful part of
Handley’s analysis is his discussion on West Bank citizens being labeled as terrorists of
illegal Jewish residents, despite their house arrest, curfew, and intimidation by the
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military guards that escorts Israelis in the West Bank. This reality for Palestinians has
prompted Handley to call for the cessation of “recasting deviating actors into their
stereotypic roles” (254) and for reporters to “retell a story” by “resuscitating a narrative”
(254). Handley is calling for further investigation into the devices that allow what is
called terrorism for any other group to be labeled as the right of protection for Israeli
occupants of Palestine. Ron Kuzar continues this work in representation by exploring the
Zionist agenda and its related discourse communities. His analysis also discusses the
power Zionism can acquire in both Israeli and American government action and rationale.
My own depiction of the role of Zionism is very similar to Kuzar’s in that we both see the
Jewish centrism in Zionism as a strong justification for the manifest destiny-esque agenda
behind the expansion of Israel. Kuzar also analyzes the religious roots of Zionism and its
dual claim of god-given land for Israelis while at the same time claiming that the
Palestinians are a “rootless, mostly nomad, mass of individuals who could readily join
their Arab brethren in the surrounding Middle East” (97). Kuzar’s most powerful
statement comes in his explanation of the relationship between Zionism and the Jewish
first nation. He writes that Zionism says the Holocaust is something that “should never
happen to the Jews again, and for that, every price is worth paying” (108). Kuzar writes
that this meaning of Zionism creates a “militaristic, xenophobic, racist ideology that is
expressed in Israel’s wrongdoings toward its Palestinian citizens and those in the
Occupied Territories” (108).
One of the most specific articles in terms of language is Leon Barkho’s “The
BBC’s Discursive Strategy and Practices Vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israel Conflict,” which
analyzes media reporting on a purely linguistic level. Barkho’s overarching point is that
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the syntax, word choices, and even sentence structures chosen by the media continuously
reinforce the image of the Palestinian as an Arab terrorist. Barkho finds one of his foci in
the term militant, which is habitually applied to Palestinian forces in direct contrast with
the IDF, the Israeli Military. The use of this term serves several functions, the most
integral being the inability for any other title to be applied to Palestinians who are facing
a far larger and technologically sophisticated military. Barhko’s analysis works by linking
its linguistic analysis to Fowler and Halliday, shifting the focus from communication to
the power of discursive structures. However, what makes Barhko’s article so incredibly
relevant to this project is his use of language analysis to “uncover the ideologies or sets of
ideas which journalists introduce in their writings in order to make sense of their world”
(278). Although his entry point is linguistics and mine the ideograph, both projects work
to establish the connection between language and power.
Chapter Outline
As this is an ideographic analysis, chapters will center around two discussions:
The first is analyzing the ideograph’s power and presence within our present day
discourse. The second discussion centers around the creation of an alternative narrative
and understanding what another shift in these ideographs could do for the so-far stagnant
conversation around Israel-Palestine, Zionism, and a two state solution. Chapter two
begins with the diachronic analysis of the ideographs and their traditional use in Western
discourse. Because the ideograph is the intersection of history and present society,
analysis of past discourse is required in order to understand current social phenomenon
and emergence of discourse communities. Western activity in the Middle East has
historically consisted of economic and military power plays, a fact made manifest by the
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types of information the West propagates about the reality of the Middle East. The
diachronic analysis focuses on the historically dominant narratives that have helped to
construct the mass western worldview of the Middle East and the ideographs used to
articulate it. Because the history between Israel-Palestine and Western powers is so far
reaching, the analysis will focus primarily on the veins of discourse that are still
advancing the agenda of the mass media. These narratives include the conflation of antiZionism with anti-Semitism, the superiority of free democracy over Middle Eastern
political systems, and the image of the Arab as an oil-hoarding, anti-American, bearded,
Islamic, antiquated barbarian who embodies the beliefs of the most fundamental sect of
Islam. The chapter’s main goal is to show that the longevity of these discourse
communities and the assumed meaning of <terrorism> and <democracy> are a result of
ideographs.
Chapter three continues with the synchronic dimension of the ideograph by
utilizing clips of mass media programs actively communicating through <terrorism> and
<democracy>, ensuring the reproduction of the current hegemony through their rhetorical
affects. The synchronic component finds meaning in the present day uptake of citizens
and the discourse that has been synthesized from the forces of history and the
conversation of the public sphere. The chapter also serves as an attempt to expand the
concept of the ideograph from the explicitly stated to the words and ideas that are left
unsaid and unrepresented in American mass media discourse. Recognizing this omission
as deliberate, the idea of ideograph as absence exposes the agenda that is a part of what
we say and do not say. It illuminates the strategy involved in selecting our words and
their organization, and the concern for the potential ruin that can come from saying or not
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saying what we are or are not supposed to. By framing the absence of diverse narratives
as a choice with rhetorical consequences, the devastating suffocation of new and
opposing opinions and its influence over the rhetorical typography of the public sphere
can be better demonstrated.
Chapter four further addresses the project of articulating a narrative that has been
lost amongst the veins of discourse in the Western world. While chapter three uses what
is said to emphasize what is not, this chapter compiles that forgotten information into a
cohesive narrative to introduce a potential line of discourse, as well as to show what these
ideographs and their use rhetorically curtail. Utilizing the idea of absence from the
previous chapter, the chapter uses a series of tragedies from a single summer to tell a
story that the American mass media cycle has yet to deem newsworthy. The most
important thing about this narrative is not only its freedom to finally be communicated
outside of the incredible ideological advertising platform that is the media, but its
capability in combating an adversarial story that has been brewing in the West since its
initial contact with the Orient. By placing the realities and concerns of Gazan citizens at
the forefront, a rarity in the oil war propaganda age, the bragging rights, and manifest
destiny-esque rationale of the occident loses its patriotic energy while ceasing to make
civilized and humanitarian sense.
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CHAPTER II
DIACHRONIC IDEOGRAPHS: HISTORIC IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR
CONTRIBUTION TO OUR CURRENT IDEOGRAPHS
Introduction
This chapter begins the discussion on ideographs by addressing the diachronic or
historical component of an ideograph. The reasons for this historical trace are simple: the
roots of the ideograph must be understood in order to comprehend the tremendous impact
of its current form. In “Ideographs: The Link between Rhetoric and Ideology,” the essay
that established the ideograph, Michael Calvin McGee characterizes the diachronic force
of the ideograph as inescapable. He writes, “Because these terms are definitive of the
society we have inherited, they are conditions of the society into which each of us is born,
material ideas we must accept to belong” (McGee 9). The diachronic forces of the
ideograph allow rhetors to justify now by what was said then (McGee 12). With the
diachronic force, all that is required to bestow meaning and create activity is to “mine
history for touchstones [and] precedents,” (McGee 10), referencing situationally similar
historical events that have the chosen ideograph as the “structuring principle” (McGee
10). This is because the diachronic is ruled by time, meaning that tracing the historical
touchstones, recognizing the natural replacement of one ideograph by another, and
understanding the exchange of one reality for another, is crucial for analysis.
The chapter begins by introducing the diachronic element of the ideograph and
then analyzing how the diachronic forces influence the ideological meanings of the
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<west>/<Islam> and <democracy>/<terrorism> binaries. While <democracy> and
<terrorism> are the primary ideographs at work today in media discourse, they emerged
from their previous incarnations, <west> and <Islam> after the events of September 11th.
The ideograph’s ability to preserve and transport political ideologies stems from the
diachronic element. The diachronic finds meaning in the historical use of ideographs,
allowing rhetors to search history and incorporate previous uses of the ideograph as
justification for their ideas. Consequently, the events that prompt the turn from one set of
narrow ideographs to another will also be available as historical justification for belief.
I will then explicate specific ideologies that comprise the meanings of these
ideographic terms and analyze their histories in Western policy. Because it is impossible
to analyze every twist and turn that comprises Israel-Palestine’s tumultuous past, I will
adopt a more narrow focus in terms of time and circumstance and analyze what I believe
to be the most prominently emphasized parts of their long history.
Finally, I will use what is known as a visual ideograph to serve as an example of
how the <west>/<Islam> and <democracy>/<terrorism> binary is used to illustrate what
is possible in the world and how a rhetorical device can come to challenge hegemonic
political ideologies. The visual is used for two reasons: First as an example of how to
break from the oppressive meanings of these two ideographic binary sets which have
primed the Middle East for false representation and cultural oppression. Second, to
possibly introduce new ideographs to understand the relationship between Israel and
Palestine. Ultimately, I will use visual ideographs to argue that the existence of the
current Israel-Palestine narrative owes itself to the diachronic forces of the ideograph and
the knowledge derived from their evolution over a period of time.
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The Ideograph
Ideographs are seemingly commonplace terms in everyday discourse that not only
reveal and substantiate but also shape and shift ideological investments. In “The
Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” McGee defines the ideograph as a
“theoretical model which accounts for both ideology and myth” (4). While ideographs
may be initially viewed as ordinary nomenclature, they often represent “the normative,
collective commitments of the members of a public. Ideographs frequently appear in
public argument as the necessary motivations or justifications for an action performed in
the name of the public” (Murphy 423). Though ideographs are part of everyday
vocabulary and conversation, their function transcends simply that of a symbol.
Ideographs typically emerge from ideas that carry an intrinsic force from which they then
obtain greater abstract meanings. Ideographs help to translate the ideological meanings of
deeply entrenched values such as ethics, morality, identity, and belonging.
Thus, ideographs function as the persuasive elements in understanding and
eventually accepting specific narratives and truths on public issues. And while this
acceptance helps to us to define how we see our world, the presence of the ideograph also
implies that these definitions are continuous with understandings we have had before.
McGee writes, “They [ideographs] penalize us, in a sense, as much as they protect us, for
they prohibit our appreciation of an alternative pattern of meaning” (McGee 9). The
prohibition on alternative narratives results in a reproduction of the previous narrative, a
recreation of yesteryear.
McGee emphasizes the material implications ideographs create when he asserts
that “The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real discourse, functioning
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clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness. They are not invented by
observers; they come to be a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they
articulate” (7). These articulations are the languages and discourses that help make the
connection between an idea and what an observer believes it represents in their world.
Because ideographs are casually used in everyday life, they have the potential for an
incredibly long rhetorical lifespan, with shifts in ideographs only preserving and
absorbing all the meanings and ideologies buried in its previous incarnation. This
longevity allows the ideograph to adapt and thrive within discourse communities,
bestowing it with ever greater definition and functions within that community.
In “Can You Be Patriotic and Oppose the War? Arguments to Co-Opt and Refute
the Ideograph of Patriotism,” Heidi Hamilton attributes the power of contrasting
ideographs (8-9). This contrast between ideographs creates both a binary relationship and
a hierarchical system in which one ideograph denotes a more worthy and powerful state
or label over another. This hierarchical system can be seen in the history between the
West and the Middle East, which is most often characterized by violent excursions and
decades of war. Critics make the point that American and other western allies are never
presented with anything but the image of the violent bearded Arab2. How are we to

Part of the mainstream narrative’s work is reinforcing the westerner’s association of
Middle Easterners with male terrorist figures. The focus on male, dangerous, figures has
resulted in a frequent use of gendered terms to construct a fear of the Middle East in both
public and academic spheres. While groups of women in the Middle East work for
terrorist groups or to impose the rule of fundamental Islam, they are rarely constructed as
dangerous or feared figures. Rarely did literature portray Middle Eastern women as
anything but political bargaining chips or sub-human hostages that require western
military intervention. In terms of this project, I used the established vocabulary as I had
never seen an example of constructing women as we construct men. For an example of
Middle Eastern women in literature, see Dana L. Cloud’s “To Veil the Threat of Terror”:
Afghan Women and the <Clash of Civilizations> in the Imagery of the U.S. War on
2
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imagine the Arab world as our comrade if we have no representation of how to go about
establishing this relationship or recognizing what it could possibly look like? If
representations of friendship between these two worlds are never shown, people can
never begin to believe that civility and cooperation are possible.
Edward Said’s Orientalism explains the creation of the oppositional ideographs of
the Arab world and the Occident as innate enemies. Said’s argument is that the
understanding of <west> and <Islam> stems from the Occident’s construction of the
West-Middle East dichotomy: that United States-Middle East incongruity is the result of
Islam rather than the Occident’s relentless oppression of the Arab world. Said writes that
the Arab and his land have always been under the control of the Occident since their
initial contact. The exhausting number of wars, interventions, crusades, projects, missiles,
criticism, and vilification that are associated with the Middle East helps to solidify the
enemy status of Middle Easterners. When Middle Easterners have acted in defiance of
this oppression, their resistance infuriates the Occident. The Occident then sees this
defiance of civilized Christianity as the barbarism of Islam. By conceptualizing the clash
of Western Christianity and Eastern Islam the Occident can condemn the Orient as the
lesser which then allows the Occident to attribute Oriental resistance to the practice of a
false, barbaric religion.
It is unsettling to think that the history of the Middle East is represented as war
and fundamentalism. But the ideographs of <west> and <Islam> do more than just decide
which parts of history are worthy of being remembered. As carriers of ideological
baggage, ideographs help to both motivate and communicate the specific worldviews of
Terrorism.
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individuals and groups, representing the group’s reality and constructing acquiescence for
their subsequent decisions. Buried in the usage of the <west>/<Islam> binary is the
assumption that to be a true American citizen you have to embrace this binary. The mass
media works to perpetuate this line of reasoning. It uses ideographs to convince its
audiences that a true American will construct the Middle East as an exotic and dangerous
land, with all of its people jealous of the progress and prosperity of the West, and
covetous of its immediate destruction. Convincing audiences to view the entire Middle
Eastern region as a threat to the American way reflects the agenda of the media. These
ideographic terms only work when the Orient and Occident are locked in battle, each
battling for the glory of their motherland and all of their abstractness. This needed
opposition forces the media to emphasize a narrative of West-Middle East incompatibility
and incongruity, all to ensure publics’ repetition and ingestion of specific ideographs. By
looking at the ideological systems that help construct the meaning of these ideographs,
we can better recognize ideographs that are used in the mass media to justify action for
itself and its audiences.
There was a discernable shift in language following the attacks of September 11th
and the beginning of the Iraq war. What used to be a binary of <west> and <Islam>,
rapidly changed into the rhetorical constructions of <democracy> and <terrorism>. While
the change in ideographic terms encouraged the nation to conceptualize September 11th
and the Middle East in new ways, this shift to new terms doesn’t negate the ideological
influence of <west> and <Islam>. The diachronic understanding of an ideograph explains
that the changes undergone by ideographs are made possible by previously articulated
ideologies. This means that the public’s understanding of <terrorism> and <democracy>
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could not have been possible without the work of <west> and <Islam> before it.
The reverence for American freedom was already a part of <west>/<Islam>
binary as a factor that separated the Occident from the more theocratic forms of
government in the Middle East. This rhetorical shift quickly entered into the media’s
reporting, providing the rhetorical link between us and them. Very soon, the rhetorical
construction of Al-Qaida’s motivations rested on the hatred of America’s democratic
government and freedoms.
George W. Bush’s first speech to the nation after the attacks of September 11th and
his emphasis on freedom and terrorism sets the rhetorical precedent that aided in the
emergence of the new ideographic binary, <democracy>/<terrorism>. Bush immediately
establishes a new understanding in the opening lines of his speech: “Today, our fellow
citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and
deadly terrorist acts” (CNN.com). This is the statement that transitions the understanding
of the Occident-Orient relationship from <west>/<Islam> to <democracy>/<terrorism>.
Bush’s description of the West as “a beacon for freedom” (CNN.com) i.e. democracy and
the East as perpetrators of “despicable acts of terror” (CNN.com) are repeated throughout
the speech. Bush states, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbor them” (CNN.com). Here is where the new
content of <democracy>/<terrorism> replaces and builds upon the content of
<west>/<Islam>. What becomes the content of the word terrorism is no longer individual
terrorists, but its Middle Eastern counties. Bush’s nuanced use of <terrorism> encourages
equating the entire Middle East to an individual group of terrorists and diversity
disappears for Middle Easterners.
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Bush continues to construct the new <democracy>/<terrorism> binary in
subsequent speeches, including his 2003 war ultimatum speech on the necessity of
attacking Iraq. Here again is the constructed contrast between the free and peaceful
people of the United States and the terrorists/dictators of the Middle East. Americans are
“peaceful people” (TheGuardian.com) who have conducted their relationship with Iraq in
good faith. He describes the Iraqi regime as “not…peaceful men” (TheGuardian.com),
whose country has a “deep hatred of America” and has “aided, trained and harbored
terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda” (TheGuardian.com). Again, Bush is
attempting to normalize the new binary by repeating the differences between Americans
and Iraqis and their government, as well as equating American’s and Iraqi’s with the
actions of their government. While Bush assures the Iraqi people that a military campaign
will be “directed against the lawless men who rule your country” and constructs the
country itself as benefitting from military intervention, he directly addresses Iraqi citizens
by prophesying that “the day of your liberation is near” (TheGuardian.com).
Saddam Hussein and “terrorists groups” continue to serve as justification for the
Occident’s newest venture into the Orient. Bush’s statements that “the terrorist threat to
America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is
disarmed,” and that The Department of Homeland Security and governors have
“increased armed security at critical facilities across America” implies that the terrorist
threat is real and attacks on the United States are on the way. Therefore, the United States
must bypass self-defense and attack “terrorists and terror states that do not
reveal…threats with fair notice” (TheGuardian.com). In other words, the United States
must fight for freedom now and distinguish terrorists groups from allies later. However,
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when Bush says the United States will strike “our enemies…and all who have aided
them” it becomes clear that the separation between lawless men who rule countries and
the countries where they rule is not going to happen. The attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq,
as opposed to Al-Qaeda are proof of this newly crafted homogenous construction for
Middle Eastern countries. The same is true for the invasion of Iraq. While the terrorist
plot may have been developed in Afghanistan or Iraq, the countries themselves are not
responsible for the events of September 11th. However, Bush’s statements allow the new
binary of <democracy>/<terrorism> to incorporate an understanding of regions as
connected to the acts of its individuals. The equating of individual acts to the act of their
home country then grants the United States permission to imperialize the region.
After Bush’s freedom logic began running on the 24 hours mass media networks,
publics were inundated with this narrative. Repeatedly airing this logic to mass media
publics accomplished a great deal in dissuading other opinions. Those who criticized
another American expedition into the Middle East or those who cautioned patience in the
aftermath were branded as unpatriotic and disrespectful by mass media. Publics of the
mass media then assumed freedom to be the sole definition of democracy as well as its
most desired result. The mass media’s intense circulation of this particular nuanced
meaning of the new <democracy>/<Terrorist> and its erasure of other interpretations
created publics who believed installing a democratic government that bequeaths their
freedom to the Middle East to be a necessity for ending terrorism. Consequently, the
freedom that comes from exporting democracy became the rhetorical catalyst for the
emergence of the new ideographs.
The media’s negative construction of dissenters not only shaped publics’
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rhetorical response, but also determined the rationale for action. Soon after Bush’s
speeches came Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom respectively,
along with plans for what is now Freedom Tower to stand in the shadow of the World
Trade Center. All of this activity would have been impossible had the historically
emphasized ideologies of the <west>/<Islam> been different. The <west>/<Islam> binary
allows people not to feel anything by othering the Arab and to see them as a follower of
barbarous Islam. Consequently, the United States had the authority to attack dehumanized Arabs without mourning the casualties. What the shift from <west>/<Islam>
to <democracy>/<terrorism> allows the United States to do is attack a state based on the
acts of individuals. No longer does the United States have to attack the state and its state
military. Now, one state can attack another simply because wanted individuals live there.
There is no distinguishing between civilians and the faceless terrorist. Terrorism could be
anywhere and anyone. Thus, a state can target anything it wants as long as they call it
terrorism by terrorists. It is, undeniably, a war without end. The degrees of separation
between the details are minute, yet the difference of ideas they convey are massive. As it
stands, the <west>/<Islam> binary that was formed years before September 11th
determined the bulk of the American political response by providing this ideological
rationale. This is the diachronic at work.
The Reverence of Freedom in the Western World
Now I am going to talk about Israel and Palestine and what actions the meanings
of these ideographs frame as possible. Ideology works by defining what is possible and
what is impossible, what we can see and what we can’t see. Without a concrete
understanding of what an ideograph is, an individual is unlikely to realize that the
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ideograph is doing work upon them and that they are continuing this work via their use of
it. Because ideographs are usually single words whose meanings are seemingly
ubiquitous, it is easy to forget the sheer amount of history and norms we are transferring
to the ears of another person. The following section takes two seemingly ubiquitous
terms, freedom and Zionism, and shows how their assumed ideological meanings allow
the United States to rationalize Israel’s actions toward Palestinians and how the history
embedded within freedom and Zionism continues to justify activity in the Middle East
via its preservation in the <west>/<Islam> and <democracy>/<terrorism> ideographic
binaries.
The nuanced conception of freedom—the antidote for the malady of inhuman
Arab terrorists as well as the justification for targeting individuals—provides a link
between the United States and the State of Israel. While the United States didn’t construct
this definition of freedom until the attacks of September 11th, the relationship between
Israel and Palestine has always been characterized by the de-humanization of Palestinians
and their classification as terrorists. Golda Meir’s denunciation of Palestinian statehood
was a precursor to the connection between absence of civilized state and absence of
humanity. Meir states, “It was not as if there was a Palestinian people in Palestine and we
came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist”
(JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). The idea of a state, such as the State of Israel, derives from
the western conception of lands with borders, democratic proceedings and a presence on
a map. For Palestine, which certainly began as a state but was eventually bifurcated by
the creation of Israel, their lack of statehood negates their humanity for states with
established borders. This helps to contextualize Meir’s erasure of the Palestinian people
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and their homeland of Palestine, but not how their lack of statehood justifies their
treatment as immoral barbarians who can never function in a state based civilized society.
Understanding the western construction of Palestine and Palestinians begins with
understanding that the ideograph, in this case the United States and Israel’s shared
understanding of freedom, facilitates action in the name of freedom. Israel began their
relationship with Palestine by using the <west>/<Islam> binary to erase the fact that
Palestinians had a homeland known as Palestine prior to the creation of Israel. With their
characterization of Palestinians as now homeless, stateless, inhuman, uncivilized, Islamic
Arabs, came Israel’s rationale in displacing Palestinians and claiming their homes as
Jewish land. This rationale for displacement stems from the <west>/<Islam> binary in
which the western construction of Islam supports inhumane treatment of its adherents.
Under this binary, people with recognized statehood can now proceed with the mass
displacement of Palestinians and the seizure of land and homes of a technically nonexistent people.
While Israel is geographically part of the Middle East, ideologically they are a
representation of the west. What links the United States to Israel is their shared
opposition to Islamic Arabs that manifests through their actions and justifications for
those actions via the <west>/<Islam> and <democracy>/<terrorism> ideographic
binaries. After September 11th, the United States adopted a similar worldview as that of
Israel on how to interact with the Arab world. The shift to the <democracy>/<terrorism>
binary that justified attacking states based on the actions of individuals allowed
Americans to understand Israel’s rationale for Palestine as well as garnered their support.
The fact that there were individual terrorists like Hamas in Palestine was reason enough
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to lay waste to Gaza and begin percolating the Palestinian West Bank. The United States’
own attacks on Middle Eastern individuals helped Americans to further understand
Israel’s action toward Palestine, as well as approve of the measures Israel was taking
against Palestinians that the United States could not. The commonality that the
<democracy>/<terrorism> binary established between Israel and the United States is still
a component of their friendship. As a democratic nation and strong U.S. ally, Israel has
been given unequivocal support for the full use of its U.S. financed military. This is
particularly true with Israel’s right to defend itself from Hamas sanctioned rocket fire as
well as its freedom to live and do as it sees fit.
The rocket fire from Hamas in Gaza into Jerusalem, i.e. the work of terrorists,
typically justifies Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories. That is not to say that
Israel shouldn’t defend its citizens. However, the rationale behind the right-to-defendargument is rarely discussed in mass media. The statement “right-to-defend” implies that
Palestine is of equal military capability and constitutes a viable threat to Israel, two
statuses Palestine has never achieved. Reporter Chris Hedges describes Palestinians as “a
defenseless population, a population that has no air force, no navy, no command-andcontrol, no mechanized units, no heavy artillery, and certainly no air force”
(therealnews.com). The state of Palestinian power and capability has been in this general
state for some time. And in the middle of war crimes on both sides, are civilians who
account for 85% of the death toll as of October 2014 (therealnews.com). Obviously,
Israeli and Palestinian power is not equal and the right-to-defend-argument is not as
applicable as the media wants its viewers believe. These levels of civilian deaths in the
age of civilized warfare would usually prompt intense scorn. But through the media’s use
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of the ideograph <terrorism> to frame the Middle East, these types of statistics become
naturalized and expected from the Middle East.
The inhumanity of the situation does not supersede the abstract ideological goals
promoted by <west>/<Islam>. It is common for the preservation of the American agenda
to justify any and all options. And as many individuals and organizations both at the
national and international level have argued, many examples of Israeli policy and action
would not be possible or even legally tolerated without the power and ideological
backing of the U.S. So great is the American influence, international laws set forth by the
U.N. have been ignored or broken, with the powers that do so receiving a verbal hand
slap and nothing more. Amongst all of the countries in the Middle East, Israel remains the
friendliest door through which the U.S. can enter and operate in the region. It is a
friendship that stems not only from its geographical proximity to terrorism, but from the
shared history of Zionism and the ties between the Jewish and Protestant Christian
religions of the U.S. The next section will provide further discussion on the history
between the United States and Israel in order to elaborate the influence of Zionism in the
diachronic element of these emerging ideographic binaries.
Christianity, Islam, and Zionism in the United States
The second diachronic ideology in the discourse of Israel-Palestine is the
traditionally pro-Zionist attitude of the United States. Zionism began gaining popularity
in the United States after World War I due to the increasing Jewish American population
and the work of Louis D. Brandeis (JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). Before Brandeis began
his Zionist work, many American Jews were opposed to the creation of the Jewish state in
Palestine. Prior to Brandies, American Jews considered the United States as their new
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Zion and considered the construction of a new Zion to be a “secular effort”
(JewishVirtualLibrary.Org) that went against God’s will. The turning point in American
and Jewish relations came in 1915 when Brandeis agreed to chair a Zionist meeting in
Boston after a great deal of research on and dialogue with Jewish Zionists. Brandeis’
work in promoting the compatibility of Americanism and Zionism further legitimized
Zionism in the mind of the American Jews. By 1917, the American Zionist movement
boasted 200,000 members and Brandeis was chairing the American Provisional Executive
Committee for General Zionist Affairs (JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). Through Brandeis
efforts, America became the financial hub for the world Zionist movement and the
creation of a new Zion.
The successful Zionist effort in establishing Israel came in 1947 when the United
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that called for the establishment of Israel
upon the termination of the British mandate over Palestine. The greatest impetus for the
creation of the state of Israel was the Holocaust and the unrelenting religious persecution
of the Jewish people. However, the justification for the existence and location of the State
of Israel stems from the Bible. The Zionist movement of the 1940’s held the belief that
the lands of current day Israel and Palestine were bequeathed in scripture to the Jewish
people and this belief is reflected in the documents surrounding the establishment of
Israel. Written in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel are references
to Israel as the natural homeland of the Jewish people. The declaration states, “In the year
of 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore
Herzl, the first Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people
to national rebirth in its own country” (JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). The declaration
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continues with, “This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people
to establish their State is irrevocable. That right is the natural right of the Jewish people
to be masters of their own fate” (JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). Finally, “We, members of the
people’s council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the
Zionist movement are here…by virtue of our natural and historical right”
(JewishVirtualLibrary.Org). Undoubtedly, this history shows how Zionism helps to
construct Israel as a non-Arab homeland.
To understand the link between the western United States, the State of Israel in the
territory of Palestine, and the treatment of Palestinians in Israel, we must recall that the
use of ideographic terms makes certain actions possible. Buried inside Israel’s western
democracy are other concepts that work to justify their characterization of Palestine and
Palestinians. The Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine share many commonalities in
their respective histories. Both are a people who have suffered through racial prejudice,
relocation, forced exoduses, the want of a homeland, the urge to return to their natural
birthplace, and attempts of systematic genocide from other powers. Unfortunately,
Israel’s uptake and understanding of <west> and <Democracy> prevents it from
understanding and connecting to Arab Palestinians in this way. Because <west> and
<Democracy> construct the Arab as outside of civilization and disrupters of international
peace and freedom, Israeli’s have formed their own modern state by denying its land and
opportunity to those who lived there before. The understanding of <Democracy> i.e.
freedom, allows Israelis to displace and discriminate against the Palestinian race in the
same way the Jewish race has been displaced and discriminated against. Said
acknowledges Israel’s conception of the Arab as unwanted and unsuitable for Israel when
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he writes “If the Arab occupies space enough for attention, it is as a negative value. He is
seen as the disrupter of Israel's and the West's negative value. He is seen as the disruptor
of Israel's and the West's existence, or in another view of the same thing, as a
surmountable obstacle to Israel's creation in 1948” (286). The idea of the Arab as an
obstacle to establishing free civilizations continues to this day, where Palestinians are
removed from their own land and forced into the shrinking Palestinian territories.
Refuting Zionism in the United States, a country that has historically had the
agenda of the Christian bible in mind, is an incredibly unpopular course of action. The
American emphasis on the tie between Christianity and Zionism is reflected in both
<west> and <Islam>. Remember that ideographs find meaning through their contrast with
another ideograph. The religious foundations in the <west> are strengthened by the use of
<Islam>. Already Islam was excluded from the western world through the previous
binary. Its juxtaposition with <west> implied that Islam is not part of the Western world
nor is it a concern for western citizens. With <Islam> transforming into <terrorism>, the
religion is now thought to be a recruiting ground for terrorists, and the choice between
Israel and the Middle East becomes easy. Israel’s friendship with the West combined with
the violence between Israel and Palestine has served to strengthen the ideological
understanding of these binary ideographs. Consequently, the influence of Zionism in the
history of American/Israeli/Palestinian relations is inextricable and has become both the
judge in subsequent diplomacy in Palestine and the dominant lens through which to view
Arab populations.
While the majority of this chapter’s analysis has focused on conversation and
spoken discourse, ideographs are used in a variety of other communicative discourses.
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One such method is visual discourse. Because ideographs are represented ideologies, they
can be utilized not only in speech, but in visuals such as maps, advertisements, and
monuments, all the while retaining their ability to produce tangible consequences.
Because a vast percentage of human information is absorbed visually, an image assures
that whether or not someone means to, they will visually ingest pieces of the ideological
arguments around them. It matters not if they are in accord. The visual ideograph will still
function as feedback in the mind as one continues to live and breathe in the ideologies of
the ideographs around them.
Visual Ideographs
Below is a created image that was used by Eileen Fleming in Oregon’s Salem
News as part of a series on Palestinian history and tragedy. Shown in four frames, the
image depicts the changing borders of Israel-Palestine, starting at the creation of the State
of Israel in 1947 and ending in 2005. The image is constructed to show how Palestinians
have lost their land to Israeli expansion in an attempt to fill an absence and it challenges
the assumptions of the Israeli ideograph of <Democracy> that is used to justify the
relocation of Palestinians in order to seize their land. While the visual appears to
neutrally depict border change over time, it actually depicts the horror experienced by the
Palestinian people. Fleming’s particular use of this image as one of exposure is a popular
technique online and it often accompanies texts that discuss the horror of Palestinian life
that is typically obscured by or is never demonstrated in a political map.
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Figure 1. Graphic of Israel and Palestine’s changing borders

I have already established that ideographs produce material changes in the world.
For Palestine, many of those changes come in the form of conflict. One such conflict is
over space, which is justified by Israel’s and the United States’ ideological understanding
of <Democracy> and how it characterizes the Arab Palestinians. The first frame of the
map shows the British territory of Palestine prior to the creation of Israel. Despite
Palestine being owned by the British, it was still a place where Palestinians lived and
where they had been living throughout history. Notice the map designates the territory as
a definite area named Palestine along with the legend in the upper left corner of the first
frame, which labels the green Palestine areas as Palestinian land. The term Palestinian
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designates that not only is this the land of Palestine but also the land of Palestinians, the
people living there as British subjects. The first frame also features the small Jewish
settlements in the British territory of Palestine. Jewish settlements in Palestine are a trend
that continues into the modern day. The Jewish people have continued to settle more and
more Palestinian land even in the face of international laws that forbid them to do so.
However, the conception of freedom does not allow for the Jewish people to see their
actions as illegal. Zionism has legitimized the belief that Israel-Palestine is land given by
God to the Jewish people. Palestinian land is their natural and historic birthplace and their
supposed ownership of this land has excluded Palestinians from their own ancestral
homeland.
The second and third frames represent the United Nations’ conceptualization of
the State of Israel within Palestine and the actual borders of Israel upon its creation
respectively. In the second frame, Israel and Palestine now share approximately half of
the land, both Israeli and Palestinians are acknowledged as a sovereign people and the
Palestinian people still have a connected state that maintains their communication and
identity as Palestinians. There is no living in either the West Bank or Gaza. There is just
Palestine and Israel in what appears to be a viable two state solution. Unfortunately, the
second frame is only a concept of how Israel and Palestine could possibly co-exist
together, so the UN’s plan never becomes the reality. However, referring back to the
dehumanization of Arab Palestinians through the use of ideographs designates the UN’s
plan as an impossibility. The freedom and Zionist ideologies embedded in <Democracy>
does not allow for the Jewish people to conceptualize Palestinians as capable of living
within a civilized society like Israel.
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The third frame represents the actual borders of Israel-Palestine upon Israel’s
establishment and brings attention to a now bifurcated and reduced Palestinian state into
what is now Gaza and the West Bank. The conceptualization of Israel-Palestine borders in
the second frame are vastly different than those in the third frame. Notice the nearly
twenty year span of time that this image illustrates. From 1949 to 1967 the UN’s
conception of the Israel-Palestine border changed from what appeared to be a working
two state solution to the creation of Palestinian territories Gaza and the West Bank rather
than the state of Palestine. These are currently the borders that are drawn on a political
map. However, this particular frame in conjunction with its parent article conveys
something that a political map cannot: the consistent reduction of Palestinian land
through Israel’s continued expansion. This particular frame also illustrates why the
creation of the State of Palestine is harder to conceptualize and accept for other state
recognized powers. The citizens of the West Bank and Gaza are not connected as a state.
They have their identity as Palestinians amongst themselves, yet no concrete and
connected state in which to showcase this coherent identity on the international stage.
Palestinian fragmentation feeds into the idea of a stateless, non-existent people and
further supports the western belief in the ideologies of the <west>/<Islam> and
<democracy>/terrorism> binaries. With the State of Palestine absent in both conversation
and political maps as well as their constantly adjusted and reduced borders, it is
impossible for Palestinians to escape the west’s dehumanizing ideological beliefs and
gain entry into statehood and civilization.
The final frame continues the conversation of Israeli expansion by showing the
continued settling of the West Bank from 1967 to 2005. The fourth frame addresses
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Israeli expansion more directly than the previous frames. For example, the legend in the
upper left hand corner of the fourth frame sees a shift from Israeli land to Israeli and
occupied land. This changed label gives the fourth frame a sense of motion and
immediacy to the dissolution of the Palestinian West Bank while the prior frames label of
Israeli land and Palestinian land communicated a sense of legal boundaries and separate
but cooperative peoples. Another examples is the porous state of the West Bank due to
Israeli settlements in the region. Not only are Gaza and the West Bank dissected from one
another, now the West Bank has also been cleaved into minute swathes of land, further
isolating Palestinians from one another. These Jewish settlements force repeated exoduses
of the Palestinian people and corrals them into miniscule, densely populated pieces of
land. Fleming’s article uses this map to demonstrate the horrific consequences for
Palestinian people from Jewish settlements. Of course, with the freedom and Zionist
ideologies of <democracy> backing it up, Israel can continue to claim the land as rightly
belonging to the Jewish people and continue their occupation of Palestine.
These settlements, which displace Palestinians and force them to retreat to
increasingly dense strips of Palestinian land, have been repeatedly condemned by the
United Nations, Amnesty International, countless refugee organizations and various
figures in political, celebrity, and academic spheres. Unfortunately, the amount of public
outcry is not enough to halt the trend and implement international law. A created image
like Figure 1 is an excellent representation of humanity/inhumanity in a technical
document and justifies the outrage of Pro-Palestine advocates. This is not the case with
political maps, which naturalize the locations of borders without an explanation or
analysis of why borders are the way they are. By choosing to focus on one view point, the

38

image excludes countless others, and reality is obscured by the presence of “Truth.”
Including these types of humanistic facts and statistics in political maps would serve as a
great first step in removing the objectivity from inhumane practice.
This assumed objectivity obscures an image’s unethical use in everyday
circumstances. For those who don’t study visual rhetoric, the image is often considered
an unbiased point of view, a view just happened upon by a deist eye. The reasons for the
image, the strategy behind its presentation, and the eye on the other side of the image are
all thought by audiences to be innocent of desire or opinion. The assumed objectivity of
the image allows audiences to separate what they are seeing from what or who the image
is representing, which results in the unethical erasure of human suffering. Technical
writing scholars have been discussing the need for the ethical use of visuals for over a
decade. In their article “Cruel Pies: The Inhumanity of Technical Illustrations,” Sam
Dragga and Dan Voss explain that visuals “in certain rhetorical situations-especially in
the reporting of human fatalities-conventional illustrations offer inhumanity as though it
were objectivity” (265). The authors state, “Technical illustrations are never objective
representations of reality, but socialized constructions of multiple subjective
interpretations of available filtered evidence” (266). Elaborating on the false neutrality of
visuals, Dragga and Voss claim that the average viewer is far more likely to assume that a
visual is unbiased or is without agenda than they would information presented through a
different medium. This is because the average individual has far less experience with
reading and understanding a visual mode of presentation, meaning they haven’t as much
knowledge going into a visual situation (Dragga and Voss 265). This inexperience allots a
visual ideograph more persuasive power and efficacy, as viewers are far more likely to
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see the visual as neutral rather than another option in rhetorical choice.
While ideographs like <terrorism>, <west>, <democracy>, and <Islam>
contribute to the support of Palestine’s reduction, they also contribute to the ethical
problem of offering “inhumanity as though it were objectivity” (Dragga and Voss 265)
when reporting human fatalities. The nonchalance around Palestinian death stems from
the <terrorism> ideograph. Terrorism has taken on a different meaning since September
11th. The word is overwhelmingly associated with the Middle East in political and media
conversations. Of course terrorism and terrorists come in all forms. But <terrorism> has
linked the act of terrorizing to the Middle Eastern population, implying that the act is
exclusive to that part of the world. Now that the publicly understood image of terrorism
has assumed a Middle Eastern visage, the death of individuals who are thought of as
potential terrorists erodes the concern for human rights violations. Because of Middle
Eastern action against the United States on September 11th, terrorists are thought of as
violently anti-American, sub-human nuisances that disrupt the Western plan.
According to Edward Said, the Occidental has always viewed the Oriental as subhuman, whether it be in the study of the Oriental as an object of study (11), as a war zone,
as a barbaric warring group, as a sexualized fantasy, as an oil pit or as something that is
taking up space. He writes, “More than anything else, the political and cultural
circumstances in which Western Orientalism has flourished drew attention to the debased
position of the Orient or Oriental as an object of study” (96). Said writes that these and
other associations with Palestinians and the rest of the Middle East arise from the simple
fact that any other type of representation or presentation that the Occident could possibly
identify with have been suppressed or dismissed until forgotten from the social
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conversation. Both the omission of any differing, more humanizing representation of the
Middle East along with the representations that are allowed to circulate about the region
are rhetorical acts. They enable the greater availability of one public’s discourse over
another, guaranteeing far greater circulation and attention. Because a level of rhetorical
resistance has yet to be seen, the adversarial relationship between the West and the East
has continued and the ideographs have remained active in language and conversation. It
is in consequence to these long lasting rhetorical representations of the Arab people as
innately and historically barbaric toward the European interest, that the violent factions of
Islam have come to be representative of the entire populace.
McGee agrees with the ideograph’s inability to represent a Truth. He writes, “We
can characterize an ideograph, say what it has meant and does mean as a usage” (9). It is
irrelevant to look for the truth in ideographs as we can never assume that any human is
capable of deriving and understanding a pure meaning “unpolluted by historical,
ideographic usages” (9). That does not mean that ideographs should be discarded from
the meaning making process. McGee locates the significance of the ideograph in their
“concrete history as usages” (10), rather than in an assumption that someone will use
them to present the truth we have all been missing. In terms of usages, the necessity with
these ideological representations is that everyone has access to the history they have
influenced along with the opportunity to incorporate them into their own freely expressed
ideas. Lest, the ideology of the oppressively powerful masquerade as common sense.
Conclusion
The pages of history and analysis required to pull this chapter together was
altogether revealing. The couplet of a millennium of history and the astonishing amount
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of skewing work completed on the subject have turned the topic of Israel-Palestine into a
winner’s game for anyone wishing to see past the propaganda. To understand the place
and pace of events requires a more extensive and comprehensive knowledge of the area,
cultures, histories, foreign policies, and religious influence than the media and overly
regulated academia can give. That, coupled with the lack of resources outside of Middle
Eastern war and imperialism makes it highly improbable, nay practically impossible, to
turn to a source other than the mainstream narrative. While a multitude of stories,
worldviews and histories should await the curious public, the tragedy is that they are, for
the most part, not there. The purpose of the diachronic analysis is to show that this is not
a recent, nor is it an unconscious or innocent event. Because these sources are so
encouraged and widespread (the media, academia, and politics) their influence on the
public is easily discernible and their power quickly demonstrated.
For the diachronic part of the ideograph, I have included what I believe to be the
dominant influences on how these ideographs and their accompanying narratives
currently work. The imperialist filled interaction between the East and West, the insult to
American freedom and power that has dogged the entirety of the Arab community since
September 11th , as well as the comradery shared by the United States and Israel help
support an overwhelming majority of decisions and justifications reported to citizens.
Now that I have discussed the diachronic dimension of the ideograph, the next chapter
will analyze the synchronic dimension via the representations of American mass media.
The media chapter focuses on the synchronic or social dimension of the ideograph. As
they are inseparable from one another in forming the dimensions of the ideograph, the
historical sets up the conditions as to why the social still holds onto historical
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constructions and uses them in current/modern society. The synchronic analysis will build
from the diachronic by allowing us to locate these same assumptions and rhetorical
constructions in the current day ideographs, working to explain the ideologies that are
embedded in the specific usage of these terms
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CHAPTER III
ABSENCE AS IDEOGRAPH: THE AGENCY OF THE UNSPOKEN
Introduction
In appearances on three major networks, Palestinian journalist Rula Jabreal
dropped a statistical bomb about the absence of Palestinian representation on mass media.
Informing hosts and viewers alike that the ratio of Israeli to Palestinian voices was
greater than 10:1 (DemocracyNow.com), Jabreal attributed American’s strong support of
harsh pro-Zionist policy and lack of knowledge of Palestinian civilian life to this
rhetorical imbalance. In broaching the topic of ever worsening news bias on a prime time
news program, Jabreal highlighted mainstream journalism’s failure to provide a
comprehensive analysis of world events, an absence that leaves viewers to fall back on
their long standing beliefs and conflations on Islam, Palestinians, and the entirety of the
Middle East region. Her use of the phrase “Palestinian voices” is particularly apt; it
reiterates the basic points of this project about the state of Palestinian self-representation
in mass media, as well as draws attention to a situation that can be characterized as
extermination without representation for Palestinian civilians. With the American
ideographs of <terrorism> and <democracy> working to support Israel’s well-being and
prosperity over Palestine’s, Jabreal’s commentary on the lack of voices requires an
analysis that goes beyond tracing racial and religious tensions and political
maneuverings.
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This chapter will examine how the use of ideographs create an absence of
alternative narratives and histories of Palestine. The mass media communicates these
ideographs through several kinds of texts, including: reports, visuals, choice of words,
heated exchanges, as well as through the blatant hostility shown to guests that are not in
league with the mass media’s worldview. The synchronic analysis draws attention to the
media’s use of the ideographs <terrorism> and <democracy> in order to illustrate two
ideas: First, their textual use in the mass media results in an informational lack or absence
around the topic they ideologically oppose. Understanding this absence as a lack of
representation for Middle Eastern voices and their narratives is the first step in
understanding how the media creates a homogenous audience. Second, the creation of
this informational void and a particular audience is intrinsic to these ideographs’ agency
and continued domination. That is to say that the consequences of the mass media’s
specific usage of these ideographs are the continued ignorance and demonization of the
Arab world. Undoubtedly the method, debating the power of something defined as
absent, can seem counterintuitive. Fortunately in a study such as rhetoric, which deems
our rhetorical choices and terministic screens as important, this absence couldn’t be more
salient and powerful. While theorizing absence and ideographs is uncommon in
scholarship, I suggest that the absence of information that results from the
communication of ideographs is as much a part of their function as the information they
convey. More of the focus in ideographic analyses rests on what has been said, circulated,
and supported rather than the potential buried in what has been silenced. Even though
absence as ideograph isn’t an academically established concept, there is still a great deal
to obtain from analyzing these absences of information in this manner. Arguably, the most
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crucial rewards are the questions it forces us to raise in regards to Palestine: What does it
look like to actively silence a burgeoning narrative? How do these ideographs stifle
opposing opinions? And finally, what truths would be established and what actions would
be inspired had more neutral and pro-Palestine narratives been allowed to circulate?
The concept of absence as ideograph spawns from the work of Chaim Perelman
and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and their conception of presence and audience. Perelman
defines presence as “the rhetor’s linguistic projection of important elements into the
audience’s sphere of consciousness” (Long 4) along with the “argumentative schemes
which the rhetor uses to persuade an audience” (Long 5). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
define the audience that is being persuaded as the particular audience. This relationship
between the rhetor and the particular audience is rhetorical, meaning that establishing
presence has to be accomplished by persuasion via the “amplification of an audience’s
“opinions, convictions, and commitments” (4). According to the authors, a “rhetor who
attempts to gain the adherence of an audience’s mind and who, simultaneously, addresses
a multiplicity of audiences, must first reduce the minds into a singular mind,” (Long 4).
This singular opinion group is known as the universal audience.
While the universal audience is a powerful tool in persuading the particular
audience, it is actually “a creation of the rhetor who refers to it so that a particular
audience will adhere” to the convictions of the rhetor and the throngs of people that
supposedly support them. Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca are correct in classifying the
universal audience—an unknown mass of individual minds whose level of conviction
nearly elevates a belief to the status of “self-evident truth” (3)—as an incredibly
persuasive element for the particular audience. This is especially true for huge platforms
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like American mass media, whose viewership is in the millions. When rhetors work to
transform their particular audiences into a universal audience, they become both “a
member of the audience” (3) and secure the adherence of others as they become part of
the imaginary universal audience. Instead of looking at what is said to reduce diverse
thoughts and audiences, this analysis concerns itself with what must be silenced in order
for the universal audience to flourish. By analyzing the talking points emphasized by
mass media mouthpieces, the narratives that are discouraged for particular audiences can
be better seen and understood.
Absence as a Function of the Ideograph
Ideographic influence in the American mass media goes beyond language. The
ideograph can conduct its work in any component of news broadcasts such as in a logo, a
headline, or the types of guests a news program features. In light of the ideograph’s
rhetorical flexibility, this chapter’s analysis will begin with the verbal and then extend its
reach to the non-verbal dimensions of American mass media. Non-verbal aspects include
the speaker(s), their tones, the placement of hosts and guests on the screen, and
accompanying visuals. The analysis incorporates these artifacts not only to show the
blatant, but also to verbalize what has been left unspoken in the strategy of rhetorical
choice. The fact that rhetorically effective speaking involves choice of and strategy with
texts is incontrovertible. It is because these rhetorical choices must be made that far more
is left unspoken in conversation. It is impossible to say everything at once, inevitably
excluding texts and meaning from every conversation. The American mass media is no
different.
Understanding absence in the various components of American mass media starts
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with understanding that these information deserts are not the result of network time
constraints, ongoing investigations, or accidental oversights. They are purposeful and
agentive. It is a common mistake on the part of the non-elite public to consider their
media as a moral counterweight or watch dog agency to the elites of society. Even in the
information age, audiences’ technologically advanced and custom designed news feeds
are more filtered and narrowed than anything prior. Intellectual giants such as Noam
Chomsky have been exploring the media’s influence and what it presents/omits from
public conversation since the 1970s. In a speech on his and Edward S. Herman’s 1988
book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Chomksy
details how public consent is accomplished through specific media techniques, such as
“the selection of topics, distribution of concern, by the way they frame issues, by filtering
of information, by emphasis and tone . . . but crucially by the bounding of debate, to
make sure that it doesn’t go outside of certain limits (The Film Archives 0:50-1:06).
These limits that Chomsky is referring to are the opinions of those “on the left”
and “on the right,” (Chomsky 15) a limited spectrum ruled by private power that
represents the ceiling for what Americans know to be true and/or possible. Limitations
such as these could not exist if the mass/mainstream publics were too aware or if they had
improved knowledge of sources that are unaffiliated with mass media. Communication
studies has continued to advance ideas concerning the media’s work in controlling public
thought while incorporating rhetorical studies (including visual rhetoric) to build on
Chomsky’s linguistic base. This intellectual expansion now allows us to find value in
what media talking heads are saying, the ideologies their terministic screens reveal, the
strategic placement of specific discourse as well as the rhetorical nature of visuals, both
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seen and unseen.
Absence of the Verbal
The first network that uses nuanced ideographs is CNN. CNN is one of many
networks that utilize the popular culture of martyrdom narrative. The culture of
martyrdom narrative asserts that Palestinians are willing to die for Hamas’ approval so
they can earn money and prestige (The Moral Divide 4:44-4:47). This narrative has a dual
purpose: the first is to obviously maintain the prominence of this characterization of
Palestinian citizens and the second is to rob Palestinians of any human resemblance in
favor of imagining Palestinian civilians as eager martyrs. On July 12th, 2014 CNN Jake
Tapper brings up this phrase to former PLO legal advisor Diana Buttu when he expresses
that she “can’t believe [Palestinians] don’t want to die” (The Moral Divide 4:23-4:27).
Buttu spends the remaining minutes of the interview rebutting Tapper’s widely held
assumption and restores humanity to Palestinian civilians explaining that they, like all
other human populations, want to live and live their lives peacefully. Tapper is noticeably
floored by Buttu’s rationale: Just look at this culture of martyrdom “we hear about all the
time” (4:28-4:31). This statement aligns his view with the unchallenged ideological
assumptions reflected in our media. Tapper says nothing ground breaking. Rather than
taking the rare opportunity to speak with a pro-Palestine representative, legal expert, and
Palestinian woman, Tapper prevents Buttu from explaining her expert of Palestinian life.
Buttu’s inability to speak about Palestinian life is the type of absence that typifies
American knowledge on Palestinians. By preventing Buttu from presenting Palestinians
as life loving humans, Tapper conflates citizens that are “used” as human shields with
Hamas itself. Even if the claims of Hamas using children as human shields are correct, it
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does not mean that their human shields understand and acquiesce to this. Nor does it
mean that Palestinian civilian culture demands the martyring of family members.
Centering the discussion on civilians apart from their government is the absence that
allows commentary like Tapper’s to run unopposed and uncomplicated. For Tapper, the
children, Palestine’s next generation, seem to symbolize the next wave of Hamas
members as well as serve as a living bridge between Hamas and the older civilians of
Gaza. If the indoctrination of fundamental ideas is what Tapper fears for the children of
Palestine, what better solution than to allow the open dialogue of the world against the
actions of Hamas to reach their ears? Why not permit the world and Palestine to reunite
and rob Hamas of its human ammo? It is because Tapper’s persistence in discussing
Hamas rather than the lives of citizens with Buttu maintains the media status quo.
Tapper’s focus makes it clear that what the media believes its particular audience needs to
hear is the discussion around Hamas, rather than discussing what life must be like as a
citizen in present day Gaza.
There has been a long running effort in the mass media to encourage the
conflation of Palestinians with Hamas, Middle Eastern terrorist groups, and the mystique
that has historically surrounded the Orient for members of the Occident. One of the most
successful methods in accomplishing this conflation is accusing the Palestinian people
and their supporters of being in league with Anti-Semitic attitudes. Intellectuals such as
Chomsky, Earl Raab, Brian Klug, and Allan C. Brownfeld have clarified the distinction
between Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism. The former refers to a critique on the policies
of the state of Israel and the latter refers to the prejudice and hatred of Jews as a national
ethnic group. In an interview with Chris Phillips, organizer of the Million American
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March Against Fear, which serves as a memorial for Americans and Muslims that have
died in the wars following September 11th, Fox News’ Sean Hannity creates an absence
by conflating Anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism. Phillips explains that the march is open
to any non-violent individual, including Muslims, who wants to memorialize the
Americans and Muslims who have died since September 11th. When Hannity hears that
Muslims are invited to the march he conflates the American Muslim with Hamas,
Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and accuses the rally of hosting anti-Semites
(SaveOurLiberty 4:36). He paints Muslim civilians as inherently anti-Semitic due to
their belief in Islam, making the march appear to be anti-Semitic because it is AntiZionist.
Hannity’s ideological line is clearly drawn with this kind of statement. His
changing the march’s title to the Million Muslim March (a phrase he uses for the
remainder of the interview) showcases the very fear the march aims to dispel around
September 11th and the American Middle Eastern population. His outrage over the fact
that there could be a million Muslims at an “American” march, or a million Muslims in
the United States at all, further demonstrates his use of <democracy> to denote only nonMuslims as Americans. Phillips’ explicit statement that those in attendance are not
followers of radical Islam nor are they anti-Semites attending an anti-hate rally does
nothing to deter Hannity’s association of Muslims with terrorism.
Despite Hannity’s follow up assertion that the United States takes great pains to
distinguish between practitioners of Islam and radical Islam, he and his co-host continue
to accuse Phillips of hosting a platform for “flaming anti-Semites” (4:04) who blame
Israel (4:12). This statement directly establishes the link between those who have lost
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family to Zionist policies and those who want to suppress the Jewish people based on
their ethnicity and their religion (anti-Semites). Hannity’s guest speaker—although one
could easily mistake him for a co-host based on his allowed commentary time—is just as
pejorative, implying secret agendas, and ignorance of “real” American’s feelings about
Arabs and September 11th. Combated from both sides of the screen, Phillips then has to
directly state that anti-Zionism is not anti-Semitism (5:20), which was met by Hannity’s
very articulate “Mmm Hmm” (5:26). Since Fox News is the most popular news outlet in
the U.S., its extreme and unsubstantiated claim that radical and anti-Semitic Muslims
benefit from this march has now been communicated as objective, hard hitting journalism
to an incredible amount of viewers. Fox News’ popularity and self-made label of fair and
balanced news makes it easier than ever for its massive audience to believe these types of
accusations.
The most striking aspect of this video is that it shows how serious the work
involved in maintaining hegemony can become. <Terrorism> and <democracy> work to
create a land, people, and time that appear to be at stake. And Hannity and company are
not scared of using their discourse as verbal projectiles raining down on their guest, in
much the same way the adamant barrage between Palestine and Israel continues even
now. Phillips is sandwiched between two Caucasian males, armed with accusations and
patriotic speaking points meant to chastise those working to remind Americans that their
Muslim brethren also lost family, friends, and direction in the aftermath of September
11th. Set in the middle of a thrice split screen, Phillips is caged, not unlike the citizens of
Gaza, while his rationale is rebuked. Phillips is on the defensive for the majority of the
interview and is unable to elaborate on other issues around the march. Again, the
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alternative Palestinian narrative is silenced. The active suffocation of an already gasping
narrative for the overwhelmingly pro-Zionist viewers of Fox News couldn’t be on greater
display.

Figure 2. Screenshot of Chris Phillips’ FOX NEWS interview

Echoing Jabreal’s statistics on Israeli vs. Palestinian voices, the dual hosts get to
contribute far more words to their rationale than their lone guests. They interrupt; they
speak pejoratively of the anti-hate march, and concentrate not on what they say but how
loud they say it. By segment’s end, Muslim Americans are again cast in the image of
overseas terrorists, the Middle Eastern brethren they march to honor are not mentioned
again, and the veracity of the entire anti-hate march has been called into question.
Hannity’s questioning the propriety of American Muslim’s marching in remembrance
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shows that Muslims, regardless of their citizenship and patriotism, are excluded from this
ideology’s definition of democracy and the acceptable American citizen. Therefore, they
are not to be supported or represented in the narrative that is deserved by the real
Americans and they are not to mourn their loss on a day meant for home grown patriots.
Absence as ideograph is not exclusive to explicit verbal argument. Absence does
not only apply to the information that is suppressed or put under taboo. It also applies to
the information that should, but never, comes to light. While reporting on the shelling
between Israel and Palestine, Diane Sawyer of ABC news displayed a picture from what
the anchor claimed to be Israel post-bombing. Featured in the photo was a Palestinian
family salvaging through the wreckage of an Israeli bombing, the destruction around
them comprehensive and overwhelming. All the typical machinations were present: the
emphasis on the tragic irony of murder in the Holy Land, a child’s image to remind
viewers how easily that could be their own children, and the fallen buildings that recall
the metonymic visual the United States has attached to September 11th; the fall of the
World Trade Center. The next night saw Sawyer again with the same image but a vastly
different story. Sawyer began her report by apologizing for a network error. After
receiving word from by pro-Palestinian journalist Rania Klahek
(NewYorkDailyNews.Com) that their featured image was from Palestine rather than
Israel, ABC had no choice but to let viewers know of their photographic mistake. After
assuring viewers of the networks dedication in reporting factual, up to date news, Sawyer
moves on without the sympathetic monologue the image received the prior evening.
Because the story is led by an image rather than an expert or guest speaker, Sawyer is not
forced into rhetorically stifling points of views that contradict the status quo. Rather, she
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glides over the image, denying Palestine the empathy and understanding extended to
Israel.

Figure 3. Photograph of Palestine post bomb strike

Absence of Visual Rhetoric
What would have been the travesty in ABC following up on that story? If the
story and its accompanying image were so newsworthy when connected to Israel’s
devastation, what changes this urgency now that the child is Palestinian and those
buildings house her Palestinian kin? Whatever the official excuse is, ABC and its
mouthpieces are not apologizing for the misinformation and misleading. Nor are they
apologizing for interrupting their viewer’s evenings with such sadness or for surprising
them with a frightening image of destructive misery. Instead they are apologizing to both
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their viewers and owners for accidently showing the reality of Palestine at all, illustrating
that this particular image was supposed to be absent. ABC’s choice to remain silent on
the true circumstances behind the photo is a noteworthy one, as the relationship between
words and images is not slight. According to Barbie Zelizer,
Words and images can support each other by recounting in text what is
shown in pictures; words can narrow what an image shows by directing viewers
toward parts of the depiction deemed relevant to the story; words can broaden
what a picture shows by generalizing it through a broader message; words can
diminish or refute what the image shows by directing attention to aspects of the
story that are not depicted. Which aspects of the about-to-die image are
underscored in adjoining texts is critical. (59)
Even the typical disastrous debate would have been preferable to the complete silence on
the matter. At least through debate, what is considered unequivocally to be the democratic
liberation of the world from Hamas can be further complicated.
The agency involved in images works differently than that of verbal discourse.
While popular talking points can slip by unnoticed or become lost in the soup of
everyday conversation, an image can be poignant and unforgettable. The undeniable
evidence before one’s eyes has the capacity to inspire pathos in a viewer and help define
what and who the casualties actually are in the messy business of war. But how many of
these images are not misidentified and remain squared away? Do we see the bullet ridden
bodies of Palestinian children as much as the frustrated yet insulated Israeli civilian? The
absence of these images means the absence of their impact. It means that the publics will
never get the chance to remember these images and to be moved by their depictions. The
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images of Palestinian suffering will never have that opportunity for rhetoricity, to be
rhetorical. And the audience will never get to experience their own reaction toward and
point of view of that image.
One of the most disturbing images of that terrible summer was the final seconds
of three boys playing soccer on a Gazan beach. The boys were killed by an Israeli
military shelling in the middle of their match. Their deaths prompted a massive local
response that was mentioned by several journalists on Twitter. Despite the story’s rocky
road to mass media coverage, those captured last moments amassed, arguably, greater
attention than the details of the shelling itself. The situation ended as expected: the U.N.
unresponsive and the U.S. state department stating that Hamas was ultimately responsible
“for Israel killing of 4 boys in Gaza shelling by not agreeing to a ceasefire” (Ayman
Mohyeldin Twitter). Although a great deal of footage and photos never gained traction in
the American mass media, the images that did make their way to the publics of mass
media still saw a greater outcry than was expected. The images were not of the boy’s
lifeless bodies; Images that certainly exist and are recognizable in the international
community. The image shown mostly in America media was of the four boys still alive
and playing, only moments before the shelling was to occur. Zelizer titles these images as
“about to die” images, using the knowledge of certain death to discuss the responses
these images typically evoke in an audience. Undoubtedly the emotion is present. The
inevitable death of unknowing children should evoke a very real and human response.
Despite the certainty that the boys are dead, Zelizer describes these “about to die” photos
as offering a “still-redeemable hope of responsive action” (317). This is due to the
difference in viewing an image that depicts the dead verses one that depicts the about to
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die. By seeing these children alive rather than dead, they come to represent the
Palestinian children that may see a different future rather than those now gone. If the
parameters of American journalism allowed for more photos of the dead, the response
could have been incredibly different.
Still, the images leading up to their death are hard to look at and are, in some
ways, more devastating than the footage of the shells impacting the beach. Though the
boys are never shown dying, the particular audience is left to look and imagine that final
dwindling minute, their imaginations filling in the gruesome details and sealing the
rhetorical power carried by the image.

Figure 4. Image of civilian Palestinian children
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For American news viewers, this appears to be the preference. Zelizer notes that
“though people tend to recall more about the news when visuals depict what is
happening, viewers have definite assumptions about what should and should not be
shown, and many regularly try to constrain images by notions of decency, taste,
appropriateness, and tone” (20). It is curious to more than one that despite the
proliferation of violence elsewhere in culture, viewers remain “so uncomfortable by the
same images when they are shown as part of the news” (20) that images of the dead from
war or torture are often labeled as graphic and promptly removed from sight. Public
opinion and focus on Hamas via statements like those of the state department may have
been what halted the momentum of these images and prevented them from disproving the
devotion that is thought to thrum so strongly between Palestinians and the idea of
martyrdom. What the impact of this photo could have been is impossible to say. What can
be said is that the partial suppression of this photo and the state department’s blaming
Palestinians for the deaths helped to divert attention and bypass the conversation around
the image. It is another instance where the narrative is suppressed rather than used to
understand life in Gaza.
The second image accompanying the shelling tragedy is of a grieving mother to
one of the dead children. Taken and shared on social media by MSNBC reporter Ayman
Mohyeldin, the image depicts a woman inconsolable, the simple caption stating she had
just heard the news of her son’s death. While Ayman’s photograph and a video of the
mother and family members’ hysterical mourning circulated through international news
media, American mass media was far slower to react. Ayman, an eye witness to the
carnage, was immediately removed from Gaza by MSNBC and other networks were
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sluggish in putting together a story to deliver to the viewing public. The image received
far greater attention on social media than on television with Ayman Mohyeldin prevented
from reporting his account after his swift replacement from Gaza. We have already seen
how newsworthy the shattered innocence of a child can be for American viewers from
ABC’s mistaken photograph. Therefore, it makes sense that visuals from this tragedy
would have to be handled smartly, lest these children become the next Mohammad alDurrah. Particularly crucial is the reaction evident in both the mother’s photograph and
the rarely mentioned video that captures the tearful aftermath of the blast. While children
killed in Gaza are frequently called martyrs, the reactions of the family left behind give
no indication that this was the desired outcome nor that they derive any pleasure from the
death required to receive such a title. Visuals like that of the grieving mother could go
very far in proving that the culture of martyrdom may not bring the happiness we are told
it does. Unfortunately, when the story is accompanied by statements that Israel does not
target civilians rather than possible solutions to saving the future of the Palestinian
people, attention is re-directed, talking points repeated, and another almost narrative is
created.
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Figure 5. Photograph of grieving Palestinian mother

Images and Rhetorical Difference
As I have stated in previous chapters, audiences perceive particular genres to be
objective. The map and the news are two such genres. According to Barton and Barton,
mapping practices imply objectivity by appearing to describe phenomena rather than
representing their construction (Ideology and the Map, 3). Their discussion on
denaturalizing the natural shows the map as a document that both includes via emphasis
of specific information and excludes via repression of other information. Because a map
deals in natural boundaries like the edges of land, the beginnings of the oceans, and the
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ends of the Earth, audiences are inclined to trust a map as being truthful and without
agenda. Yet, as chapter two points out, a political map such as that on a globe is incapable
of articulating the constructed nature of national borders as well as mentioning the human
blood that is part of these borders’ composition.
The footage of Phillips’ interview with Fox News operates under the same
unbiased and objective label for non-expert audiences. First, the history of media and the
philosophy of journalism have assured the public that reporting is just that, relaying
information, data and statements in their exact context. Second, the construction of a
news program like Sean Hannity’s gives the show a sense of being live and completely
unrehearsed. The panel speaks in real time, on breaking and current issues, with guests
being brought in mid conversation or mid analysis. The tension in Phillips’ interview also
works to create a sense of an unrehearsed and objective atmosphere. The intensity from
all three panelists plays out before our eyes and we appreciate the seemingly genuine
emotion from individuals defending their beliefs. Despite the look of Hannity’s show, the
segment is very much rehearsed. As the host, Hannity knows the angel of his interview
and the direction he wants the conversation to follow. Since Fox News is a juggernaut in
media in the United States, Hannity is also well aware of his audience demographic and
the ideologies they look to Fox News to support. Both the map and the news segment are
masquerades in logos, meaning they capitalize on the power that the word objectivity
bestows on an idea or opinion. Using the audience’s assumed belief of objectivity and
harnessing the power of logos is how these genres do their rhetorical work.
Conversely, the photos from Palestine possess a different rhetorical function.
While the map and the news footage work through logos, the images of Palestinian life
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gain meaning through our sense of pathos, or our emotional reactions. While the
objective genres force the audience’s acceptance through naturalization, photographs,
particularly about to die images, can inspire a want of change. It feels much easier and far
more desirable to change the circumstances of a human life than to move a country’s
borders. Because while the lay of the land appears to be a non-negotiable, the continued
suffering of women and children does not. It is rare that any feeling human would
explicitly wish for or justify such a thing before an audience. Using pathos and giving the
audience permission to think something is wrong or needs to be stopped exposes the
myth of photographic truth. By capturing a cruel and unnatural action like genocide
through a supposedly objective medium complicates the audience’s understanding of the
image. As Zelizer points out, the chosen moment of an about to die image can inspire a
sense of hope and the thought of change within an audience. Suddenly, the image is no
longer how something is and shall remain for the rest of time. It is now the recording of a
singular moment whose outcomes have reasons and authors, both of which can change.
Conclusion
Clearly understanding the innards of mass media requires a great deal more than
passively listening to what is explicitly said and more than only looking at what is shown.
It can be far more telling to ask what remains behind the lips and what stays on the tip of
the tongue. What are we seeing, not just explicitly seeing, when we are shown an image?
What has been left out of the frame of reference when we behold a picture? These are the
questions that need to accompany visuals. In regards to Palestine and Israel, the media
operates on a policy of a deliberate absence; one that is just as purposeful and rhetorical
as what is presented to viewers. The diachronic shows us that this absence has habitually
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reoccurred via others constructing the Palestinian people and culture, as the synchronic
affirms the livelihood of these past oppressions and justifications in our present thoughts.
This absence is true too in the images published by mass media. Yet these images need to
reach a broader range of mass media particular audiences to add a much needed
complexity and humanity to the conversation. Zelizer writes that “viewers make images
meaningful in ways that might not be readily apparent, photographs facilitate making
sense of the world in a way that is not necessarily rational, evidentiary or reasoned”
(Zelizer 13). Meaning that a visual image cannot show our eyes everything they need to
see in a single frame, but it can evoke our strongest emotions and sense of veracity with
one look. Because the image has the ability to show and obscure a moment of reality,
strategy is key in evoking both or either of these abilities at the opportune moment.
When seen, images can start a “complicated battle of meaning over what was seen
and its relationship to what was known” (Zelizer 202), beginning new ideas and discourse
that will spread through the social conversation. Naturally this is all in theory and the
process can be interrupted, leaving a blank space where dialogue should reside.
Extending consideration of the ideograph from its ability to materialize to its ability to
obscure allows the power of absence to become known and contributes to building a path
to rhetoricity for the unmentionables. The next and final chapter will continue with the
“what would be” tone of this chapter in an attempt to construct the very narrative that is
missing in the current conversation. This chapter used what has been and what is being
said to show just how much energy and strategy has gone into maintaining the popularity
of this singular line of discourse. Because we now understand the types of information
that are systematically excluded for control purposes, we can now examine this content
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and better see the rhetorical potential residing in the truth this absent information
communicates.
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CHAPTER IV
LOOKING AT THE CREATION OF A COUNTERPUBLIC FOR GAZA
Introduction
The previous chapter illustrated the silence that stems from the work of the
synchronic and how this silence contributes to the emergence of a dominate narrative.
This final chapter will transition from the discussion of the popular narrative to those that
are less mainstream. To do so, I will introduce the concept of a counterpublic: what they
are, their work in the public sphere, their potential in changing leading ideologies of
entire discourse communities, as well as their necessity in open and democratic public
debate. The discussion on counterpublics sets up the second part of the chapter; my own
example of a possible counternarrative that has been silenced in the public sphere.
Focusing on a civilian shelling by the Israeli military, my counternarrative will
implement the work of the international community, journalists, and public intellectuals
to construct a narrative that, because it challenges a dominant narrative, would not
receive the circulation and affirmation of other media backed sources. The previous
chapters have shown that no matter the circumstances that unite them the eventually
circulated record of Occident/Orient interaction will be one of violence, cultural clashes,
and long held grudges. The animosity that has festered between the Occident and the
Orient has influenced destructive truths for each group; truths that have been reinforced
by the recent decades of Middle Eastern war and the post September 11th climate. As this
chapter will demonstrate, it is incredibly difficult to overcome these naturalized
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ideologies and the institutional money that backs them. Attempting to say that these two
worlds are not locked in a pre-destined feud, that we are not the enemies others say we
are, is difficult. These ideas go against the accepted narrative. The counternarrative I
provide will be no different. By including an example of a counternarrative, I want to
make visible the effort demanded from those willing to tell an unpopular and unsupported
story, the pitiful amount of public and rhetorical space available for the conversation, the
importance that lies in the existence of counterpublics along with the continued rhetorical
and intellectual diversity of mass media audiences.
The previous chapters have analyzed various dominant narratives in the public
discourse. Looking at the dominant historical and social narratives along with their
influence on the current narrative helps to show the specific ideologies that have
influenced western perception of the Middle East. Publics are responsible for the
discourse that communicates ideologies and truths in the public sphere. The assumption
of the Habermas’ public sphere is that publics will be allowed their rhetoricity and
actively be given space to expand their argument, thereby contributing competing
ideologies and complexity to public discussions and policy. Unfortunately, the nature of
the public sphere has not been so fair. According to Michael Warner, “Dominant publics
are by definition those that can take their discourse pragmatics and their lifeworlds for
granted, misrecognizing the definite scope of their expansive address as universality or
normalcy” (88). While dominant publics are those that enjoy widespread support and
their ideology accepted as ‘the way things are,’ counterpublics are those that are
positioned against a dominant public (Warner 86). Counterpublics are organized by the
same self-activity and discourse as publics and often emerge as a “scene in which a
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dominated group aspires to re-create itself as a public and, in doing so, finds itself in
conflict not only with the dominant social group, but also with the norms that constitute
the dominant culture as a public” (Warner 80). Often a reluctance “to be mistaken for the
kind of person who would participate in this kind of talk or be present in this kind of
scene” (86) forms in the public sphere when confronting societal norms or traditions.
This results in silent and inaccessible ideas. These silenced ideas and their parent
counterpublics perform two vital functions in the public sphere: They help us understand
the diverse ideologies that can form around a topic and encourage people to question
what they may think is unquestionable. They also work to show different ways that
strangers can interact and affect one another, creating relational possibilities that defy
oppressive systems already in place. In other words, the forced silence of counterpublics
is the thievery of agency and the prohibition of information that a democratic populace is
well in their rights to hear. Without them, thought, change, possibility, and questioning
become myths in the ruling narrative.
This chapter seeks to reaffirm the necessity of counterpublics while making the
need for Israel-Palestine counterpublics in the Western world apparent. While it is true
that an effort to show the West a different side to the Israel-Palestine already exists, work
of this nature is often occluded by the mass media’s incredibly outreach. Ergo, by
incorporating a discussion on the existing counterpublics, I am contributing to their work
in bringing attention to the other stories of Palestine and Palestinians.
Because the history between these two regions is tumultuous, it is impossible to
cover everything. In order to limit the scope of this analysis, I will focus specifically on
the shelling of civilian children discussed in the previous chapter. There is an
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unmistakable timeliness in choosing this specific time period. Occurring only weeks prior
to the conception of this project, the events have yet to be analyzed as thoroughly as past
debacles. This makes the 2014 summer ripe for rhetorical analysis and the potential to
change how we talk about these two entities very strong. There are also the unique
elements that are present in this episode. The Israeli shelling of Palestine in the summer
of 2014 was very unlike recent battles in the Holy Land. An unbelievable amount of
western attention was on the conflict itself, rather than the friendship with Israel. Major
news networks like MSNBC were reporting from within Gaza, celebrities (America’s
royals) were tweeting daily messages of peace and understanding for Gazans, and Israel’s
election for prime minister was only months in the future. The potential answers for the
question “what about Gaza?” had never been more diverse. The most important variable
of this conflict is the presence of technology. The difference in this conflict is not what it
shows or mentions more. Rather, it is the amount of information that technology makes
available to viewing publics.
It is unlikely even half a decade ago that technology would have been able to
circulate Ayman Mohyeldin’s eye witness account of child casualties to the extent it can
now. Nor could technology capitalize on the audience outrage of his removal from Gaza
and his inability to report on the incident. The wails of Gazan mothers would never be
heard, their stories never told, and the ruins of their densely populated city never seen. All
of these factors work together to illustrate the atmosphere of silence not only around
Gazan voices and their narratives but also around the international publics that work to
support and circulate a counter narrative of Gaza. By discussing this silence as a
deliberate rhetorical tactic of the media rather than as a result of some cosmic backing, a
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space in the conversation for counterpublics can be created.
The Media and ‘Us’
While criticism of the media’s agenda is labeled everything from paranoia to
anarchist, the basis for criticism is quite legitimate when examining the vast differences
between its assumed and actual function. I have discussed the mainstream media’s
function as an advertising platform to explain the connection between marketable
ideological narratives and the audiences that buy and consume them. What is thought to
be the true purpose of the media is vastly different than this conception. Conceived after
the American Revolution, the media was considered a “counterweight to government,”
(Chomsky 15) and the agendas of its elite members. The iron fist of England and the
monarchy had left the newly minted American public both familiar with and concerned
about political representation. At the time, the population was no stranger to being kept in
perpetual silence regarding the political process. To assuage these fears, the people put
their hope in the printed media to function as a “cantankerous, obstinate, ubiquitous
press, which must be suffered by those in authority to preserve the right of the people to
know, and to help the population assert meaningful control over the political process”
(Chomsky 15). This view of the media is referred to as the Jeffersonian Model, its
namesake based on the devoted state’s rights advocate and federal government watchdog
Thomas Jefferson.
Despite the appealing aspirations of the Jeffersonian model, its focus on
grassroots activity and monitoring the elite never truly became the media’s modus
operandi. In fact, American print media began controlling and censoring information
almost directly after the Revolutionary War. Despite the continuing influence of wealth in
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the media, the work of the Jeffersonian Model is still sought by the public; not only in the
original medium of print, but in the newest forms of mass media. These forms include:
talk shows, news programs from Rachel Maddow to Bill O’Reilly, statements on social
media and public events that can now be documented and spread by technology. It is
evident that this hope for media refereeing still persists, as one of the most frequent
criticisms that are leveled against the media is that it is too soft on public officials. There
also remains the cautious relationship between state and federal levels of government
when deciding the boundaries of their respective powers. These types of critiques make it
obvious that the Jeffersonian status of this state to federal relationship is integral to the
history of the media.
However, the use of the media as a public gateway to what were formerly elite
matters has waned in light of the media’s current work to fashion a homogenous, dissent
fearing public. Western publics are, for the most part, informed rather than consulted on
relevant issues. While Americans fervently cling to their annual right to voice in voting, a
choice between the rich men who will cut taxes versus the rich men who will raise them
is a poor substitute for including the plebeians in aristocratic affairs. American publics are
rarely presented with a complex and comprehensive view of a story, nor are they
encouraged to seek outlets with the goal of journalism as opposed to advertising.
American mass media delivers a heavily constructed and highly censored version of
world events that has been approved for ‘real American’ consumption while remaining
impervious to the critiques of Jeffersonian watchdog agencies. It is now more apparent
than ever that working as a counterweight to the political elite is not (if it ever was) the
function of American mass media. What then, accounts for the mass media’s behavior
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and agenda? Pioneered by intellectuals such as Alex Carey, Chomsky and Edward S.
Herman, the alternative conception of mass media explains that it will “present a picture
of the world which defends and inculcates the economic, social and political agendas of
the privileged groups that dominate the domestic economy” (Chomsky 15).
Despite the undeniable evidence of this exact misconduct from mass media,
drawing the publics’ analytical gaze from the Jeffersonian model to the alternative model
has proven to be a Herculaneum effort. Even in the face of statistics, numbers, graphs,
intellectuals, scandals, controversy, whistleblowing, and document leaking, the corporate
media outlet FOX NEWS remains the most watched and trusted news source in America
(GassPolitico.com). Perhaps the doubt of the public in the authenticity of the alternative
model comes from the very word alternative, which carries a historically based
hierarchical connotation. Indeed, the fact that the most apt description of American mass
media is known as the alternative model shows the amount of stock the public has put
into the media working for them. Whatever the source of the reluctance, publics are still
directed toward deliberately biased outlets which leaves them open to the media’s
teachings against dissatisfaction. As publics and their discourse are self-organized, any
type of change in the Palestinian narrative must start with mass media publics
understanding that the media’s information is motivated by an agenda meant to
discourage and discipline the mind.
Obviously the media must remain under public scrutiny. Its wealth, power, and
ability to transport ideologies across political factions and the obedience the mass media
commands practically mandates it. It is important to understand that a greater knowledge
of the alternative media model is not required just to exacerbate the conversation about
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the wealth gap. Framing the issue in terms of expense ends the conversation at exactly the
point at which it should begin. It is not that the elite are unscrupulously spending money
and ruining the media. It is the effects that this spending has on the non-elite and
uninformed publics that matter. Because the media serves their societal purpose by “the
way they select topics, distribute their concerns, frame issues, filter information, focus
their analyses, through emphasis, tone, and a whole range of other techniques ”
(Chomsky 15), its publics have come to see their work as natural. Yet the choices made
by the media about what is important (to its specific viewers) and the terministic screens
they employ to lead the logic of their viewers are nothing close to natural. These
behaviors, both the reporting style of mass media and the audiences’ easy access to
popular mass media, are both rhetorical. Greater concern over terrorism rather than an
issue like gun control or corporate welfare is not something innate to the American
citizenry. Rather, it is the result of greater rhetorical persuasion and emphasis on one
issue over another. Because terrorism and specific view points on the issue are allowed
greater rhetoricity in the public sphere, other viewpoints on terrorism and other issues are
overshadowed and the possible conversations around them underdeveloped.
The diverse American publics are not predisposed to care more about Middle
Eastern terrorist than terrorism from other areas of the world. Nor are they unpatriotic for
not believing that this new country known as America has a fated nemesis in a
millennia’s old civilization. But the media’s implications that all of the sensical and truly
American people hold these truths as evident constantly work to override the fact that
there is no single, homogenous, American audience. The urgency of issues, fearing the
foreigner, the sense of community, and engagement with a larger audience is cultivated
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by mass media to condition its audiences. This naturalization of what the media is doing
as what the media does (or is supposed to do) has created the incentive to internalize
rather than analyze, making easier than ever to digest rather than ingest. This means that
what the media says, despite the means through which they become capable of saying it,
goes unquestioned and its ideas nearly automatically becoming a part of who we are and
the way we think. It is a different type of warfare. Psychological and pathetic (by which I
mean pathos) rather than physically domineering. Yet it is exactly the course needed to
derive consent and eliminate opposition from those who are categorized and domineered
in incredibly similar ways to those Palestinian civilians.
The Importance of Counter Narratives
The first step in attempting to aid the emergence of a new narrative is to
understand their function amongst publics and counterpublics. However, before I
illustrate how counter narratives can enter into the public conversation, I will first clarify
the meanings of the terms public, public issues, and counterpublics, along with their
specific roles in the public sphere. Michael Warner writes in “Publics and
Counterpublics” that “[a] public is a space of discourse organized by nothing other than
discourse itself. It is autotelic; it exists only as the end for which books are published,
shows broadcast, Web sites posted, speeches delivered, opinions produced. It exists by
virtue of being addressed” (2). Publics are more than large groups of people or those that
share a close proximity. As Warner points out, publics exist only by being referred to in
text and discourse. Consequently, publics gain their public definitions via the texts and
various media they or others create for public consumption. The opportunity to represent
one’s own group is not as universal as this theoretical explanation would allow us to
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believe. Publics often gain the opportunity to speak for others, resulting in the rhetorical
domination of one group over the other. The publics this project has analyzed so far are
the publics of the mass media. American mass media has a lot of monetary support
behind its work, ensuring its circulation. Because of financial backing, the ideologies and
conclusions available to publics on domestic and international issues are typically those
of the dominant and backed publics.
These issues that are discussed through discourses and texts are known as public
issues. According to Trevor Perry Giles in “Ideology and Poetics in Public Issue
Construction: Thatcherism, Civil Liberties, And ‘Terrorism”, a public issue is
A site of political meaning constructed by a rhetorical leadership
attempting to secure ideological acquiescence from the members of the
community in which it is constructed. It is a historically particular, ideologically
significant stasis that emerges from the rhetorical construction of events,
happening, situations, or exigencies. (Giles 2)
Certainly the mass media’s reporting on Israel-Palestine is an example of political and
influential leaders attempting to secure “ideological acquiescence” from citizens, with the
conditions manufactured to ensure the continued cooperation from the citizenry
comprising the hegemonic structure. The ideographs of <freedom> and <terrorism> are a
part of acquiring this acquiescence. There are also the historical and social dimensions of
the public issue, which makes the ideograph and its synchronic and diachronic elements
perfect for analysis of public issues and rhetorical pleas for acceptance.
The presence of rhetoric in public issues is to be expected. The rhetorical
construction of public issues involves a “fusion of ideographs with poetic structures” to
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“naturalize political rhetorics for the purpose of securing collective acquiescence” (Giles
2). In doing so, politicians and political commentators are using rhetoric to “construct and
define issues for the ‘publics’ attention, and second, to respond to those issues as they
have been constructed and defined,” (3) usually by offering rhetorics addressed to them.
This conjures the work of Richard Vatz and his claims of rhetoricians giving both
salience to an issue along with the language to properly characterize a rhetorical situation.
This means that everything from the definition of a public issue to the boundaries of the
community is defined by the use of rhetoric.
In the public sphere, publics or people that have a membership in a specific
discourse community who emerge to contradict the “rhetorical construction” of the
leadership are known as counterpublics. Counterpublics emerge when strangers who
“find commonality in a specific issue or difference are excluded from the dominant
public conversation and come together to represent their embodied experiences and
definitions as legitimate” (Warner 12). Counterpublics often emerge as an opposing or
opposite entity of a dominant force. In this case, the domination refers to the incredible
influence a single discourse community has on subjects, opinions, definitions, and the
circulation of information. Despite the word counter in its title, counterpublics are not
necessarily smaller or inferior to a dominant public. They are an attempt to introduce a
different worldview or perspective into the public conversation and widen what Nancy
Fraser refers to as the “discursive space” (13) which allows the needs of others to
“disseminate . . . into ever widening areas” (67). These rhetorical interactions between
publics help the public sphere to preserve its rhetorical nature through the addresses and
persuasions of interested publics, rather than transform into something characterized or
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ranked by class, market, or religion. These rhetorical interactions not only take on a
different narrative, but also utilize “alternative norms of public speech” (Fraser 61) that
work to circulate the message of these counterpublics amongst the dominant narrative.
The point that this project makes about counterpublics is that they require this
discursive space for their initial emergence. They must be allowed their rhetoricity if they
are to become capable of representing the ideas of its members. Warner states that a
counterpublic “finds itself in conflict” (80) with the dominant social group as
counterpublics deviate from the premises that allows a dominant culture to understand
itself as a public (81). This sense of conflict further explains why the space for
counterpublics around the Israel-Palestine situation is constantly diminished, leaving
them unable to acquire textual circulation and public support in the few instances that
they are allowed to surface uninterrupted. Because of the possibility of a more Palestine
supportive counterpublic gaining momentum among the masses, the instances where they
could emerge are closed, nearly pre-emptively, and the only remaining option is for
publics to resort to the popular and available narratives for their understanding of others.
Using rhetorical strategy to intentionally silence one group to preserve public consent
from another is the continuance of the hegemonic structure. Our narrow interpretations
will continue to exist without the increased proliferation of more rhetorically
representative Middle Eastern texts, cultures, and history in our most far reaching and
easily accessed outlets.
Demonstrating the Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza
With the importance of counterpublics established, the discussion can now go
beyond the theory into application. It is clear that the American viewing public has seen
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and heard their fair share of <terrorism> (what it is, who it is, what it looks like) from
their media. What they haven’t heard is a rationale that looks beyond the battle between
<democracy> and <terrorism> to the problems of violence and inhumane treatment.
Despite the diligence of non-mass media sources to differentiate between Palestinians and
their Hamas government, the media’s conflation of people and government remains
popular. Because their narratives have the potential to disrupt the global obedience held
by elites, international accounts are often argued by the mass media as reckless,
dangerous, pro-terrorist, or a cocktail of all of these factors. So effective is the media at
maintaining the status quo that wishes of Gazan peace from the most fortunate of citizens
is met with critique and disdain (Rahimi TheTelegraph.co.uk).
Obviously, the current counter narratives that circulate around Gaza and Palestine
are not having the necessary impact in terms of the public sphere and what I would call
‘making a space’ for ever more counter narratives and publics. Most attribute this failure
to the focus that is given to Hamas and the possible justifications of their actions in light
of Israel’s economic blockade and other human rights violations toward Palestine. These
discussions often require a greater knowledge of the region, the cultural history of the
Arab world as well as a thorough understanding of Israel-Palestine’s complex and
intertwined timeline; all of which have been effectively phased out of the mediasanctioned analyses that we see currently. While Hamas should remain a part of the
conversation, efforts to separate and reframe the humanitarian crisis in Gaza will not
succeed if civilian life remains an afterthought to which terrorist said what and when.
Focusing on the terrorist status of Hamas only obscures the destruction of Gazan daily
life and contributes to the absorption of the majority women and child population into the
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Hamas led government.
The following section is an attempt to construct a more civilian based narrative;
one that crafts the situation in Gaza as a violation of human rights and security that
requires immediate action. This section will pull from several sources outside of the mass
media to transcend the ideologically heavy labels halt other veins of conversation and
serve as an example as a counternarrative for Gazans. A majority of the sources focus on
an Israeli-Palestinian engagement that took place in the summer of 2014. Additional
sources come from governing or international entities such as the U.N. whose comments
on the conflict and the realities of civilian life only augment the call for interference that
fringe journalists and public intellectuals are currently voicing. Focusing on the Israeli
shelling of Gaza, the event is one that is usually ripe for the traditional American versus
September 11th type terrorists. Rather than analyze the attack itself and debate which side
had the right to fire the first missile, this narrative will focus on the aspects of the conflict
that were kept from mass media’s screens or thought to be unimportant to winning the
War on Terror. The fact that such an opposite narrative could be constructed from what is
traditionally a mass media hot spot only shows that the so called innate hatred of
American freedom that is attributed to Palestinian Arabs is not a biological fact but a
rhetorical construction bent on achieving mass acquiescence.
Those living in the post September 11th world are no stranger to the mainstream
Middle-Eastern terrorist narrative. An ideograph in its own rite, September 11th has
become the rhetorical representation of an “attack on the beliefs, values, and attitudes,”
(Long 5) and world views of the United States. Those on the other end of the accusing
fingers are the shadowy figures known as terrorists. Though terrorism can take on many
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forms, post September 11th American culture has become quite comfortable in defining
these figures as dark, violent, Arab, Islamic, Middle-Easterners with archaic clothing
choices and lengthy names. Distinguishing among Iraqi’s, Iranians, Palestinians,
Afghanis, and other countries connotatively known in America as terrorist nations is
inconsequential. All of these countries fall under the blanket term of terrorism and thus
have become part of the political public memory of that September morning. The
American mass media rationale for September 11th and the modus operandi of all
terrorism are constructed by binaries and in adversarial terms: The Islamic caliphate is the
enemy of the Christian nation, their traditions a threat to American exceptionalism, and
their agenda the anti-thesis to democratic freedoms. In reality, there is barely a time in the
Occident-Orient history that is not characterized by an adversarial relationship.This trend
has continued into the modern era.
The emphasis on the battles between these two parts of the world can easily be
attributed to the constant military presence in the Middle East, which frames Western
interaction through a narrative of violence and victory. Consider the Crusades, the Iranian
Hostage Crisis, the western response to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Gulf War,
Desert Storm, the Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan in addition to conflicts brewing in
Palestine and Syria. Time after time, the American mainstream narrative has provided
audiences with the fears and reasons for intervention in the Middle East. And while all of
these conflicts are separated by time, region, religion, ethnicity, circumstances, and
history, rarely does the western audience encounter an opportunity where they are
encouraged to recognize the different ideologies of fundamental and modern Islam or to
remember that Palestinians were not involved in September 11th. What matters to the
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mainstream narrative is only to repeat the idea that terrorism comes from that region,
from those people, with these features, this religion, and nowhere else. Man, woman,
child, moderates, martyrs, are obsolete categories. The entire region of the Middle East
has been quarantined and any action appropriate for terrorists (not terrorism) is
appropriate for the countries that fit this bill.
This is the situation in which we find Palestine and the conceptualization of
Gazan citizens. Undoubtedly, history is used. Palestine and the justification of the
treatment of its citizens is a prime example of this. It is because the incredible amount of
rhetorical privilege granted to the mainstream that their truth has become the truth, while
other worldviews stand forgotten or are simply unknown for general or non-expert
audiences. Such rhetorical dominance can be greatly attributed to the lack of
counterpublics around the issue, as they are an integral component in sustaining the
communication of different embodied knowledges and democratic debate. The following
sections will identify some of the counterpublics that have emerged from mainstream
dominance and are using history to tell a different narrative.
The first source of a new narrative emerges from powerful international bodies.
The most important institution currently is the United Nations. Despite having their
actions frequently blocked by Western powers, the United Nations has long classified the
behavior of Israel as both a violation of human rights (Ian Black, The Guardian) and a
violation of Article 51 pertaining to matters of war or conflict between two countries.
Article 51 is the origin of the “right to defense” argument that is so adamantly used to
defend Israel’s level of force against Palestine. Article 51 states that a UN nation has “the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs,”
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(UN.org) and that they are authorized “to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN.org). The
term international is key in understanding when a nation can evoke article 51 as a
justification of action as it stipulates that the attack must come from a separate, foreign
entity that is beyond the country’s national boundary. Israel’s status as an occupying
power of Palestine makes it impossible for them to invoke this article as a legitimate
defense. While two separate warring countries are allowed by the rules of war to engage
each other as such, Israel’s control and near ownership of Palestinian land designates
them as an occupying power in Palestine. Article 51 clarifies that the economic
relationship between Israel and Palestine prevents Israel from classifying and treating
Palestine as an invading force. Rather, Palestinians fall under the obligation of Israel as
civilian citizens and Palestine being a part of the Jewish entity. In short, article 51
declares that Israel is firing on their own people. A line of discourse such as this directly
challenges the mass media Ideographs, as it replaces the argument of Israel’s freedom to
protect itself with the image of a country terrorizing its own citizens.
With this line of thought, interference into Israel’s behavior would seem
inevitable. This is perhaps why the narrative remains in pieces and Israel largely
unpunished. Because the available rhetorics construct Israel as a Western-esque entity
that is being attacked without provocation (reminiscent of the American on September
11th) their actions are interpreted as the right to defense while the terrorism label negates
the basic considerations other types of combatants receive in warfare. The lack of
enforcement of the Occupation Laws is blatantly apparent in present day policies toward
the two countries. Currently, Israel’s illegal settlements in what is the occupied West
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Bank are known but never actively stopped by any power. Their behavior toward
Palestinian civilians is overlooked and their absolute control over Gazan electricity,
imports, food supply, air space, territorial waters, and taxes are never enough to legally
force Israel into fulfilling their responsibility to Palestinian civilians as an occupying
power (Aldershoff and Waelbroeck, European Union News). Truly, the discourse for such
an act hardly exists.
The United Nations has also described the deplorable conditions of Gaza as
inhuman and has reprimanded the situation that has produced these conditions. For
example, the U.N. has raised the concern for war crimes in Gaza after the Palestinian
death toll rocketed past 600 following the 16 day shelling of the Gaza Strip by Israeli
military. Defining terrorism as “the killing of civilians as a means of furthering political
or military goals,” Greenwald used his July 2014 article to bring attention to the
mounting civilian death toll in Gaza. Compiling the civilian death tolls for both Israel and
Palestine over a two week period, Greenwald blatantly highlights the discrepancy
between Palestinian deaths: 826 out of 1,101, and Israeli civilian deaths, three out of 56
(Firstlook.org). Additionally, his report found that while “95 % of the Israeli death toll”
has been soldiers, at least “75% of the Palestinian death toll” has been civilian women
and children (Glenn Greenwald, The Intercept). The Guardian reported on July 23, 2014
the U.N. high Commissioner for human rights Navi Pillay’s comments on Israel’s 16 day
assault on Palestine: “There seems to be a strong possibility that international law has
been violated, in a manner that could amount to war crimes (Yolande Knell, BBCNews).
Democracy Now soon reported that the same assault destroyed Gaza’s only power plant,
which was responsible for 30% of Gaza’s total electricity supply. (Sharif Abdel
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Kouddous, Democracy Now). A few days afterward saw Greenwald’s report on the death
toll amongst Palestinian citizens and soldiers versus Israel citizens and soldiers. Finally,
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon spoke on the inhumanity in the suffering of the
civilian Palestinian population. While visiting children in Gaza’s Jabaliya Refugee Camp,
Moon stated “I met so many of the beautiful children of Gaza. More than 500 were killed
in the fighting – many more were wounded. What did they do wrong? Being born in
Gaza is not a crime.”(Peter Beaumont, The Guardian). The U.N has yet to enact any
significant change in Palestine.
Greenwald has also tackled the Ayman Mohyeldin controversy at MSNBC. What
is interesting about the Mohyeldin scandal is its powerful contradiction of the ideographs
that have come to dominate the Israel-Palestine conversation. Ayman, an incredibly
reputable war journalist who had been reporting in Gaza since 2009, was immediately
pulled from the scene by NBC executive David Verdi after witnessing the killing of three
children playing soccer on a Gazan beach during the 16 day shelling. Despite Ayman’s
excellent reporting, which was often described as a bringer of humanity to the Gazan’s
story, as well as his fluency in Arabic, he was replaced before he could report on the
killing by Richard Engel. Engel, despite having not witnessed this tragedy, was given the
opportunity to report about the deaths on MSNBC. Mohyeldin was able to send a tweet
about the incident and publish pictures of the grieving parents but assumed a period of
internet and media silence in the aftermath of his replacement. He would not surface to
describe the event on air for several days. NBC has yet to give a credible excuse as to the
reason behind his removal nor have they reported a reason as to why he was not allowed
to report on the issue despite being on the scene.
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In a printed interview with Democracy Now’s Amy Goodman, Greenwald cites
the fear of major media outlets angering U.S. Israel supporters as the motivation for
removing Mohyeldin. Despite the crowding in the public sphere, it is possible that
Mohyeldin’s humanizing reporting along with the pathos behind the image of grieving
mothers could have been an incredibly persuasive and rhetorically powerful visual.
Greenwald then stated that “one of the things you almost never see in major American
media reporting is anything that shows the suffering of Palestinians” (Goodman), which
has changed with the advent of social media and the agency it bestows upon Gazans to
record and circulate Israeli military action inside Gaza. Greenwald’s comments on
Palestinian suffering also draws our gaze to the wailing faces of the grieving mothers.
Suffice to say, Ayman’s photos do not communicate the faces of women who have
endorsed the culture of martyrdom for their children. It would be a tremendous task to
persuade me otherwise. Meanwhile, Mohyeldin’s attempts to dismantle the assumption of
the culture of martyrdom have been met with disdain and accusations of being a “Hamas
sympathizer” (Goodman) and a doubter of the “U.S. government and Israeli position”
(Goodman).
The blatant juxtaposition of conflicting images of freedom is what lends itself the
most to this tragedy. Freedom is the prey of terrorism. It is clear that the idea of freedom
represented in the mass media is a freedom that belongs to American decision makers and
their actions as the global power. Its reach in global affairs is unprecedented and its
support of Israel against Hamas unquestioned. In the case of Ayman’s account, freedom is
this group of little boys playing soccer in the sunshine. In the midst of a decimated and
war torn territory, where 44% of the already shrunken Gazan territory is designated a no
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man’s land by Israel (Rosenfeld) and agriculture and livestock destruction has resulted in
“mounting food insecurity” (Shaoul), playing and running on even a polluted beach (AlMughrabi) must feel wonderful. Ayman’s account of the tragedy casts the popular
freedom of defense argument in a stark light. A new and less American centric narrative
already exists. The question is, are the publics of mass media gaining access to these
types of cover ups and political maneuverings? Or, are they subjected to a rhetoric that
bypasses the tangible in favor of abstract concepts of glory for an imagined homeland?
The answer to that question comes easily when you take into account the amount of work
one has to do in order to find these articles and piece together the story of only one
shelling incident. There are no full stories, nightly segments or hyperlinked article trails
that categorize newsworthy stories. This type of information is not featured, it is not
debated, and it is not discussed. According to the rules of a public, its lack of address
means that the resulting public of this dialogue doesn’t exist.
There is and will continue to be persuasive lines of logic on the relationship
between the two countries, as well as the rhetorical representations of Gazans as
extensions of their democratically elected Hamas government. Should the current media
trends around the American narrative go uncontested, the Palestinian point of view will
continue to be marginalized in mainstream journalism and the creation of a counterpublic to the current narrative will go unaccomplished. In other words, the current use of
<terrorism> and <democracy> will continue their rhetorical work in nurturing the strong
association between Islam and terrorism, adding to the environment of fear and
accusation that has surrounded the middle eastern population for some time. In light of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Michael Sheehan’s projection
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of another possible two decades (Greenwald, The Guardian) in the War on Terror, it
stands to reason that the media will continue to have a great deal to report on, including
the decade’s long dispute between Israel and Palestine. Consequently, working to see
mainstream media’s version as exactly that—one constructed version of a truth in a
historical conflict—can then allow for the presence of other ideas and narratives to enter
into the conversation; narratives that better rhetorically construct the citizens of Palestine,
the diverse values of the American populace, and the Islamic populations that are
portrayed as the face of global fundamental terrorism.
Conclusion
Just a few months into the research for what would become this project, I came
across this tidbit in my local newspaper. On October of 2014, an Illinois newspaper
named The Pantagraph received a question about the population density of Gaza in
comparison to McLean County (the home county of the magazine). In comparing the 1.8
million citizens of Gaza to the approximately 170,000 citizens of McLean County, the
newspaper’s Bill Flick wrote:
Although big in the news, the Gaza Strip is 8 ½ times smaller than Mclean
County (139 square miles compared to 1,186 miles)….If the county had the
population density of Gaza, incredibly, it would have around 15.3 million
residents. That would also make Mclean County population larger than all but for
U.S. states (California, Texas, New York and Florida). (The Pantagraph.com)
How striking it was to find this in a local newspaper, when I had yet to find anything
remotely similar in larger media outlets. In what is always a conversation about
aspirations, allies and enemies, patriotism and come uppance, these numbers are
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arresting. Subsequent research would find this information, its flummoxed tone, its
disbelief at the proportion, and its precise portrayal of the spatial reality of the Gaza
occupation, to be a rarity.
There always seemed to be a reason for something to come before the destruction
of the Gazan population during the research phase of this project. Rarely did I find
instances where these civilians were given precedence over the haunting images of
September 11th, the horror of the Holocaust, the economic relationships between nations,
domain over the Holy Land or simple partisan disagreement. And even rarer was the use
of the welfare of citizens and their unjust treatment as a determinant for the next course
of action. Rather, an endless waltz of rockets, broken cease fires, and professions of
support for a two state solution continues to serve as diplomacy and foreign policy. Even
with the knowledge that the media is but a sliver of the true public opinion (which is
incredibly democratic for the most part) their stories are still the go to for understanding.
The media’s influence and their mass circulation of these ideographs have made it
possible for even the most invested individuals to be screened from the idea Palestinian
humanity. It is a hater of American freedom that wants Palestinian peace, an unpatriotic
citizen that criticizes military action, and a threat to domestic interests to be soft on Israel.
These are the implications that are buried in the ideograph and the message that is
communicated to the millions in a cyclic 24 hour news apparatus. And while these
analyses of the media are riddled with rhetorical concepts and a sense of the ivory tower,
their claims of public obedience and absorption can be seen in the everyday questions
publics pose and the conversations they have with each other. At a Q&A with Noam
Chomsky on a peaceful Palestine and the media, an audience member says “there’s also
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the different mentality between the Arabs and Jews that figures into it too, don’t you
think—isn’t that always going to get in the way of peace? Chomsky answers, “They’re
the same kind of people, they have the same kind of mentality. They bleed when they’re
cut, they mourn when their children are killed. I’m not aware of any difference between
them” (135). The fact that we have gotten to a point where a statement such as this
belongs to someone designated as a public intellectual rather than one human being
looking at another shows that the work of the unrepresented masses must soon commence
if we hope to create more than just a slight space for dissidence.
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CHAPTER V
EPILOGUE
Any master’s student will tell you that for one part of one hellish year, you live
and breathe your thesis. You think about it before you go to bed, you see its influence in
all the corners of your mind, and feel the previous night’s writing thrumming through the
day’s signatures. The amount of times you are asked to explain it, challenge it,
complicate it for yourself and then simplify it for others could possibly bring you to tears.
In the Illinois State English Department the saying goes, if you can explain your thesis in
a few sentences, you know you will finish it. At my thesis proposal, which is the
beginning of all things to come, in the few casual minutes before the proceedings, I was
asked to perform this very feat. A professor who was not on my committee asked,
“Savanna, what is your thesis about”? The sentence I gave was comprehensive but
uncomplicated. All of the terms were in the right place, all of its intention perfectly
communicated. I saw the eyebrows of a much respected professor lift up. He replied,
“You know you’ll finish when you can explain your thesis in one sentence”. Of course I
smiled. Validation is always nice to hear. But there was never any doubt as to whether or
not I would finish this thesis. Or that Israel-Palestine would be the topic. Because while I
had been writing the thesis for months, I had been living with these ideas all of my life.
I was born in the swampy countryside of North Carolina. It is a place that even the
natives consider an unfortunate interruption between North Carolina’s tea colored beach
water and the clay hills of the piedmont. Not much has changed. The region retains some
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of the highest usage of colonial English in the country. ABC stores still have sly,
back door entrances for preachers who deny their alcoholism on Sunday mornings, and
the elderly still have a seat when it rains. “The Lord is doin’ ‘is work Savanna Lynn,” my
grandma would say. “Now hush”!
Nothing is outside of the Evangelical grasp, of the fire and brimstone rhetoric. The
world could end any day now. Yesterday would have been better. Under weeping willows
we read the Old Testament more than the New. I have always known more about the ark
than the cross. Early on, we internalize the word gentile- Greek for heathen- and learn
that we are the lucky adoptees into the Jewish family. Into Jesus’ family. And for this, we
are to remain grateful and reverent. A preacher on Sunday says, “The historical suffering
of the Jewish people, Jesus’ people, is something we gentile sinners can never have”. He
has to wipe his mouth with a dove colored cloth, his tenacity brings so much saliva to the
corners of his mouth. This suffering, it is not ours, so we can’t have it. We didn’t feel it,
so we can’t go back and touch it. We don’t understand it, so we can’t question it. To do so
is to doubt both the design of our only salvation along with its grand architect.
This is the incontrovertible Zionism the swamp children learn. This is what we
know when another building in Gaza falls, when the World Trade Center collapsed, when
the Gulf War began, when we leave Sunday school for the first time. Defying this lifelong
logic was to interrupt the tribal traditions of my family and risk their scorn. But the sense
of wrongness that I felt when I heard these family teachings bloomed early, and has
always shown in my eyes even when the words were not allowed to leave my lips.
While it may not be as extreme as North Carolina’s version, Zionism is still a
widely held belief in the United States. For a politician, to be soft on Israel is to wave
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goodbye to the presidential nomination. For the everyday civilian, disputing the tie
between Zionism and America is dirtier than any Wall Street deal. In a time now gone,
academic freedom was enough to protect an intellectual’s right to free inquiry. A few
months before I presented my thesis, Professor Steven Salaita was fired from the
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. The local public was in an uproar over
Salaita’s tweets on the 2014 Israel-Palestine conflict, the very conflict this project
addresses. His ideas were labeled disrespectful to Israel and he was denied both tenure
and employment. Ripples of disbelief swept through the academic community. The
aftermath of his termination was a time where I had to consider the future of my thesis
and my future as an academic very carefully. I had always seen a PhD in my future, but
suddenly I saw my error. I had wrongly assumed that in a country where the beliefs of the
Ku Klux Klan, anti-vaccination groups, creationists, religious fundamentalists, the NRA
and climate change deniers were respected, that I could make the point that one historical
genocide does not justify another. Salaita’s termination from his university proved that
assumption wrong.
Soon came the January of my final semester and the opportunity to write an
original piece on the tragedy of Palestine. What came about was a cautious compromise. I
would continue with the Israel-Palestine conflict, but would stay in the academic world of
objectivity and wear the mask of a neutral intellectual. I crafted this sense of reluctance in
my thesis not only to avoid the possible consequences of protesting the uncontested
power of Zionism, but to keep the audience’s attention where it was most needed. Going
through with the project meant that only pieces of my conviction could come through. It
is written by me, but it is not about me. It is about Gaza. It is for Gaza. And it is with
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Gaza. And while I feel it is ridiculous to suppress the natural feeling of rage at the idea of
genocide, I couldn’t give up the opportunity to write this kind of thesis. I have carried this
paper with me, within me, for years. It had to be written, even if it meant keeping a
constant awareness of boundaries in my mind and pen. This thesis sprung from my
questions, my answers, my anger, my memories, my embodied knowledge, my need to
feel, and my hope for Gazans. The possible consequences were simply not enough to take
that hope away from me. May this be the first of many projects to come.
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